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THE ORIGINS OF CAPITAL GAINS




HE proper treatment of capital gains is a recurrent issue in income
tax reform. The recent proposals embodied in President Reagan's
1985 tax program' are merely the latest round in a debate that pre-
dates the sixteenth amendment. 2 That the capital gains issue persists is not
surprising. The issue raises a host of questions ranging from the philosophi-
cal to the practical. It involves theoretical economic concepts of income as
well as practical economic considerations concerning the distorting effects
on marketplace decisions caused by capital gains taxation. 3 Politically, the
*Cf. Tina Turner, What's Love Got To Do With It? (Capital Records, Inc. 1984).
** Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to
thank Professors Michael Davis, Peter Garlock, David Goshien, and Robin West of Cleve-
land-Marshall and Professor Lewis Kornhauser of New York University for their insightful
readings of earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Professor Arthur Landever
of Cleveland-Marshall whose suggestions helped guide my research concerning the Lochner-
era Supreme Court. This Article could not have been written without the help of Ms. Judith
Kaul of the Cleveland-Marshall Library and my research assistant Ms. Julia Nolan, both of
whom showed astonishing abilities to locate obscure materials. The Cleveland-Marshall De-
velopment Fund provided support for this research.
1. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH,
AND SIMPLICITY 164-73 (Prentice-Hall ed. 1985). President Reagan's proposal is known fa-
miliarly as Treasury II (or Son of Treasury) because it is a response to, or a modification of, the
Treasury's proposals for reform submitted to the President, at his request, in November 1984.
TREAS. DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 100-01 (Prentice-Hall ed. 1984) (Treasury I). Treasury I proposed the
abolition of the preferential treatment of capital gains under current Code section 1202, under
which 60% of net capital gains are excluded from the income of noncorporate taxpayers.
Under the Treasury's proposal, capital gains would be taxed at ordinary income rates. The
bases of capital assets, however, would be indexed for inflation. The President's proposal re-
tained the exclusion but reduced it to 50%. Beginning in 1991 taxpayers could elect to index
the bases of capital assets instead of using the exclusion.
2. The sixteenth amendment, ratified in 1913, states: "The Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several states and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend.
XVI.
3. The two major areas of economic distortion are the lock-in effect and the preferential
treatment of capital gains. Lock-in occurs because only realized gains are taxable. Thus, so
long as a taxpayer retains his property the unrealized gain is not taxed. The longer the prop-
erty has been held, the greater (potentially) the gains realized on disposition. Thus, a tax upon
these gains creates a deterrence to changing capital assets. Because investments are frozen or
locked-in to avoid taxation, assets may not be used efficiently. The capital gains tax preference
mitigates the lock-in effect but creates market distortions and inefficiencies since an artificial
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capital gains debate raises the issue of what income should be taxed, regard-
less of economic definitions, and in what manner. Political and economic
analyses of these questions may differ from philosophic explorations of who
should bear the burdens of taxation. Finally, at a purely administrative
level, capital gains taxation creates problems for the tax system. It is the
source of much of the complexity of the Code as Congress constantly enacts
provisions to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains at
a pace only slightly less frenetic than that of clever taxpayers (and their
lawyers) who devise the schemes that Congress attempts to prevent.4
As Congress and the nation once again prepare to examine the capital
gains issue, an historical look at the origins of capital gains taxation in the
United States is appropriate. An historic perspective yields insights that can
lead to better, more informed choices regarding proper treatment. It also
provides important information on the nature of our tax system by examin-
ing in a specific instance how our courts and legislature perform in the tax
area.
The standard view of capital gains is that they have always been taxable
under the sixteenth amendment and the statutes enacted under it.5 This
view distorts reality. Although every statute since the sixteenth amend-
ment's enactment has taxed gains from dealings in property, that these taxa-
ble gains included profits from the occasional sale of property outside the
normal course of business was not clear at the outset. In March of 1921 the
United States Supreme Court settled the issue in a series of four cases (the
capital gains cases). These cases not only presented a common legal issue,
but also raised economic, administrative, and constitutional problems.
From an economic standpoint, the Court's decision in the capital gains cases
(regardless of whether that decision was ultimately for or against taxation)
was destined to affect the income tax system's revenue-producing capacity.
preference is created for those assets that produce capital income as opposed to ordinary in-
come.
The literature on the economic distortions related to capital gains taxation is voluminous.
See, e.g., infra note 5; R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 195-97 (1976); R. Mus-
GRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 438 (1980); Minarik,
Capital Gains, in How TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 241 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman
eds. 1981).
4. The classic example of complexity is § 341 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as
amended, dealing with collapsible corporations. Needless to say, many other sections also
attempt to prevent the transmutation of ordinary income into capital gains, such as § 83 (re-
stricted property transferred in connection with service), §§ 724 and 751 (dealing with partner-
ships and inventory items), and §§ 1239, 1245, and 1250 (depreciation recapture sections).
Joseph Pechman, the noted Brookings Institute economist, stated recently in Pechman, An
Overview of Current Tax Reform Plans, 27 TAX NOTES, Apr. 15, 1985, at 311: "The law has
become completely incomprehensible to all but a few specialized tax lawyers and account-
ants." Pechman was speaking of the Code generally, but his analysis is especially true of the
capital gains provisions.
5. E.g., L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
13 (1951); Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains, in 2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1243,
1243-45 (1959); Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153,
155 (1983). But see J. WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 9 (1985). A
comprehensive treatment of capital gains is contained in the treatise 2 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME ESTATES AND GIFTS 50-54 (1981).
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Similarly, the decision would have an impact on the administrative feasibil-
ity of the tax system by affecting the degree of flexibility and certainty that
the system could provide. Finally, the decision would influence the balance
of power between the Court and Congress.
The Court's decision was not an inevitable conclusion drawn from legal
precedent since that precedent was so contradictory that a decision either
way required a repudiation of some prior Supreme Court statements.
Rather, contemporary economic and political considerations profoundly in-
fluenced the decision. The Court's ultimate decision, which it based on con-
stitutional interpretation, was that capital gains constituted income. That
decision provided the best resolution of the economic and administrative is-
sues confronting the Court. More importantly, the decision clarified the
roles that the Court and Congress would thereafter play in the tax area.
Prior to 1895, Supreme Court cases had indicated a general deference to
Congress when the taxing power was involved. The relationship in the in-
come tax area, however, was muddied by cases such as Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co.6 and Eisner v. Macomber,7 in which the Court struck
down on constitutional grounds congressional exercises of the taxing power.
The capital gains cases restored the precarious balance of power and reestab-
lished a pattern of behavior that still holds today: a deference of the Court
to Congress and negligible constitutional restraint on the taxing power.
This Article has two interrelated narratives: the origins of capital gains
taxation, and the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress.
The underlying theme of both narratives, however, is as important as the
factual content. That theme, simply put, is that results can neither be under-
stood nor judged independently of the context that created them. We tend
to view taxation as an exact science because of its involvement with numbers
and economics. In the tax area, however, as in other fields, an historical
viewpoint is a necessity. In the words of Harold Groves: "Taxation is an art
and a technique as well as science, and it always needs to be judged against
the conditions of time and place."'8
I. THE 1921 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Historical Setting
In 1921 the United States was troubled by the aftermath of World War I.
Governmental demands for revenue remained high largely because of the
need to pay off war debts. 9 Inflation was high, as was unemployment; facto-
6. 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (declaring the 1894 income tax
act unconstitutional).
7. 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (declaring the income taxation of stock dividends
unconstitutional).
8. H. GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 24 (D. Curran ed. 1974).
9. E.g., SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 27-28, 47-49 (1920) [herein-
after cited as ANNUAL REPORT]; N.Y. Times, May 30, 1920, § 7, at 1, col. 5. The then current
popular demand for an army bonus for soldiers would have put another strain on governmen-
tal resources. See The Treasury's Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1920, at 6, col. 2.
1985]
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ries were idle. The country was, in fact, in the midst of a depression.10
Many viewed the income tax system as a prime cause of the depression. The
highest marginal tax rate in 1921 was 73%." Popular commentary theo-
rized that those high rates, coupled with the unsettled state of the tax law,
stifled business transactions and caused capital to flow into tax-exempt se-
curities instead of industry. 12
The nation was still operating under the Revenue Act of 1918. That Act,
like its immediate predecessors, had been passed when wartime conditions
created a pressing need for revenues. Consequently, the statutes had been
passed hurriedly without any detailed study of what an income tax should
be. 13 The entire federal income tax system, in fact, was largely experimental.
The first income tax acts had been revenue-producing measures, which were
passed during the Civil War and had expired shortly thereafter. 14 The next
act, the Income Tax Act of 1894, was declared unconstitutional in 1895 on
the ground that taxes on incomes from real and personal property were di-
rect taxes, which the Act failed to apportion among the states by population
as required by the Constitution. 15 The sixteenth amendment, ratified in
10. E.g., 61 CONG. REC. 8591 (Appendix) (1921) (statement of Rep. Keller) (the U.S. was
in "the severest financial depression in its history"). See generally G. SOULE, PROSPERITY
DECADE: FROM WAR To DEPRESSION 83 (1947, reissued in 1964) (unemployment rose and
industrial production fell).
11. The "normal" tax on net income above the personal exemption amounts for 1918 was
6% on the first $4,000 and 12% on income above that amount. For years following 1918 the
percentages were reduced to 4% and 8% respectively. The personal exemptions consisted of
$1,000 for single persons (or married persons living apart), $2,000 for husband and wife living
together, and $200 for each dependent. In addition to the normal tax, a surtax was imposed on
incomes greater than $5,000. The surtax was graduated from a low of 1% up to 65% on
incomes greater than one million dollars. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18,
§§ 210(b), 211(a), 216, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062-64 (1919).
12. E.g., 61 CONG. REC. 5135 (1921) (statement of Rep. Bacharach) (tax drives money
out of business, deprives commerce of necessary capital; real estate and building industry are
"starving" for lack of capital); see also, e.g., Editorial, Frozen Investments, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 1921, at 12, col. 2 (taxpayers afraid to invest due to uncertainty of tax consequences).
13. Hamel, The Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 5 NAT'L
INCOME TAX MAG. 161 (1927) (earlier statutes were "trial and error" experiments). The
National Income Tax Magazine later became the present day Taxes. Hamel was legal counsel
and chief of the Simplification Division of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.
14. The Civil War measures decreased after the war and finally expired in 1872. The tax
rates varied, but at no time exceeded 10%. Further, less than 1% of the population was
affected. 1 S. SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (1972). The next
income tax law, the short-lived 1894 Income Tax Act, taxed net income above $4,000 at 2%.
For a recent, short history of the income tax, see S. SURREY & W. WARREN, supra; Grossfeld
& Bryce, A Brief Comparative History of the Origins of the Income Tax in Great Britain, Ger-
many and the United States, 2 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 211, 237-50 (1983). Four older treatises are
still extremely valuable: R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1940); R.
MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) (rev. ed. 1945); S. RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION
(1942); E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (1911). J. WALTMAN, supra note 5, provides an in-
depth analysis of the political origins of the income tax through 1921. For additional back-
ground, see 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 5, 1.2; W. HEWETT, THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AND ITS APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION 7 (1925) (Civil War and Reconstruction in-
come tax laws).
15. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601, 616
(1895). The constitutional provision that requires apportionment of direct taxes among the
states by population is U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See infra notes 256-57 and accompanying
text (discussion of "direct" taxes).
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1913, removed this constitutional barrier by granting Congress the power to
collect taxes "on incomes from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment." 16 Immediately thereafter Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1913.
The income tax section of that act was a mere 15 pages long; it established a
normal tax rate of 1% and a graduated surtax rising to 6%.17 Before much
experience could be gained with the new law, war preparation and then
World War I itself drastically increased the need for revenue. Congress met
this need by enacting a variety of taxes: numerous excise taxes, an excess
profits tax, a capital stock tax, and, most importantly, an ever-expanding
income tax.
The patriotic fervor that had sustained the numerous taxes and their high
rates during the war had waned by 1921. People wanted "the heavy burden
of taxation caused by the war" reduced. 18 The need for revenue, however,
remained high. Analysts projected that at least 4 billion dollars would be
required in 1922 and 1923.19 Consequently, even President Harding, who
had been elected in 1920 on a Republican platform that favored reducing
taxes and stimulating capital to flow into industry, recognized that the "most
substantial relief from the tax burden must come from readjustment of inter-
nal taxes" 20 rather than from an absolute reduction of taxes.
Dissatisfaction with the income tax system went beyond protests against
rates or particular sections of the law. Basic questions concerning the nature
and limits of income taxation existed. Also, the constant enactment of tax
legislation produced uncertainty as to exactly what the law taxed. At a more
basic level, the confusion extended beyond what the statute said; it reached
to what the statute could say. The sixteenth amendment granted Congress
the constitutional power to tax income. But what was income? Although
the need for the refinement of the term might be ignored in wartime, it could
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
17. Income Tax Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166, 169.
18. 61 CONG. REC. 5125 (1921) (statements of Rep. Fordney). In fact, relatively few
people paid income taxes. In 1916, only 437,036 returns were filed. By 1918 the number had
increased to 4,425,114. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J.
ECON. 527, 531 (1921). S. SURREY & W. WARREN, supra note 14, at 12, states that about 5'A
million individual returns were filed for 1920 out of a population of 106 million (5% of the
total population). This figure appears to represent the returns for the taxable year 1919 filed in
1920. See 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1110
(1975 ed.) (Table Y 402-411). Of that figure, approximately 33% had no tax owing. Id. For
the taxable year 1920, 7,259,944,000 returns were filed with approximately 24% being nontax-
able. Id. The total labor force (those over 14 years of age) was approximately 42 million in
1920. 1 id. at 126 (Table D 1-10). Thus, approximately 13% of the labor force paid taxes.
19. Hearings on H.R. 8245, PL. 98 Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) (letter relative to Internal Revenue Laws, quoting President Harding,
microfiche card no. 33 at 10, Matthew Bender ed.).
20. Id. Both party platforms in 1920 were for tax reform. Nevertheless, as Senator Un-
derwood said, political differences existed on some issues because the parties were "trained in
different schools of finance to view the question from different standpoints." 61 CONG. REC.
6476 (1921). Since tax burdens were merely to be shifted rather than alleviated, the question
became who was to bear the burden-the rich or the poor. See the statements of Representa-
tive Garner, id. at 5130-34. Garner, a Democrat, characterized the differing views of the two
political parties as follows: The Republicans wanted to shift the tax away from big business
whereas the Democrats believed in paying taxes according to one's ability to pay. Id. at 5131;
see infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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not be avoided in 1921. Post-war income taxpayers, wearied of war sacri-
fices, viewed a tax on income as burdensome and a cause of economic de-
pression. Resolution of the meaning of income, therefore, was important.
The respective roles of Congress and the Court in this resolution were not
clearly defined. The income tax itself was a result of a duel between the two
branches of point and counterpoint: point (the 1894 Act), counterpoint
(Pollock), and point (the sixteenth amendment).
Eisner v. Macomber,21 decided by the Supreme Court a year before the
capital gains cases, illustrates much of the confusion surrounding the tax
area. In Macomber the Court held that although Congress had clearly in-
tended in the Revenue Act of 1916 to tax stock dividends as income, such
taxation was unconstitutional under the sixteenth amendment. 22 Today,
scholars view Eisner v. Macomber as a case concerning the requirement of
"realization," the separation of income from capital before taxation. 23 In
1920 and 1921, however, commentators viewed the cases as concerning more
basic questions: What was income, and what were the respective roles of
Congress and the Supreme Court in answering this question?24
In summary, the Supreme Court made its capital gains decision in the
context of a post-war country in the midst of a depression. Governmental
demands for revenue remained high despite the public cry for relief from a
tax system that, some said, had led to the current depression. The newness
of the income tax, coupled with the constantly changing income tax laws,
created a general air of confusion that further hindered business. People
generally had little tax expertise; even the experts' level of sophistication was
low. The uncertainty as to the balance of power between Court and Con-
gress in the tax area added further complexity to an already confusing in-
come tax system. Income taxation created problems at several levels. From
an economic standpoint, the definition of income was unresolved; 2 5 adminis-
tratively, the income tax created numerous and complex issues;26 but the
issues of "commanding importance" 27 were the legal and constitutional
21. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
22. Id. at 219.
23. At the time, the case was generally understood to constitutionally mandate realiza-
tion. See, e.g., Rottschaeffer, The Concept of Income in Federal Taxation, 13 MINN. L. REV.
637, 645 (1929). Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940), marked a step away from that
position. In Bruun a lessee had erected a building upon rented property. Id. at 464. In 1933
the lease was cancelled, for failure to pay rent, and the lessor-taxpayer obtained possession of
the building. Id. The Court upheld the Commissioner's determination that obtaining posses-
sion was a taxable event. Id. at 467. Surrey, The Supreme Court and The Federal Income Tax,
35 ILL. L. REV. 779, 783 (1941), viewed the case as eliminating any constitutional requirement
of realization. Section 109 of the Internal Revenue Code now reverses the Bruun result.
I.R.C. § 109 (1982). Today, the realization requirement is generally adhered to for adminis-
trative convenience since the taxation of unrealized gain would require complex annual valua-
tions. Exceptions to the realization rule exist to prevent blatant abuses. See, e.g., id. § 1256
(contracts marked to market and profits taxed despite lack of realizing event).
24. The case was much discussed at the time of its decision and was still an issue in 1921.
See infra notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 82-124 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Montgomery, Reorganizations and the Closed Transaction, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (R. Haig ed. 1921).




B. History of the Cases
Since the Revenue Act of 1913, the federal tax laws have provided, with
slight variation, that income includes "gains, profits, and income derived
from salaries, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether
real or personal . . . or gains or profits and income from any source
whatever. '' 28 Since 1914, the Treasury had interpreted such a provision as
applying to gains from the sale of capital assets. On August 14, 1914, the
Treasury issued a private letter stating that gain from the sale of securities by
a beneficiary of a will was taxable. 29 In December of that year an official
Treasury decision required taxation of profits from the sale of real estate. 30
In 1919 the Treasury finally promulgated a regulation providing that income
included "gains derived from the sale or other disposition of capital
assets."
31
Thus, by 1920 the Bureau of Internal Revenue had already been treating
capital gains as income for several years. These gains were subject, under
the Bureau's interpretation, to the same tax rates as other income since no
statutory provision provided special treatment for them. The fact that the
Treasury considered gains from the sale of property income, however, did
not mean that the populace did. In its 1921 book, Income in the United
States, the National Bureau of Economic Research reported:
It seems certain, for example, that most of the farmers who sold land at
the high prices of 1918-19 failed to report their profits for taxation, per-
haps telling their consciences that those profits were not income but
increase of capital. Doubtless, thousands of owners of other kinds of
property did likewise .... So it happens that the "Profits from sales of
real estate, stocks, bonds, etc.," reported to the Internal Revenue Bu-
reau make but a minor item in their tables of total net income-less
than 3 per cent. in 1917 and less than 2 per cent. in 1918.32
28. In 1913 the income tax portion of the Revenue Act was contained in section II of The
Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 38 Stat. 166. See 38 Stat. 166, § IIB, at 167. For 1916,
see Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, 39 Stat. 756, 757, § 2a.
29. Internal Rev. Mim. LetterAug. 14, 1914, in CORP. TRUST CO. INCOME TAX SERVICE
1913-1914, at 295 (cited in Brief for Plaintiff at 80, Eldorado Coal Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522
(1921)).
30. T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. 272-73 (1914).
31. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 21, T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. 176 (1919). By 1921, the article was
revised to reflect the Eisner v. Macomber decision. The definition of income parroted Ma-
comber. Income was defined as "The gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of
capital assets." T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. 358 (1921).
32. 1 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES
44-45 (1921) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU REPORT]. The report suggests that the business-
man's lament that high taxes hindered business transactions exaggerated the amount of frozen
capital since some transactions may have occurred without being reported. The National Bu-
reau of Economic Research was created in 1920 to "conduct quantitative investigations into
subjects that affect public welfare." Id. at v. Most of its funding came from the Common-
wealth Fund and the Carnegie Corporation. Income in the United States was its first publica-
tion. The Directors of the Bureau in 1921 included many of the principal players in the capital
1985]
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In 1920 several taxpayers contested the Treasury's practice regarding capital
gains in federal court. These challenges culminated in the four Supreme
Court decisions of 1921.33
Why a challenge to capital gains taxation arose at this time, but not previ-
ously, is unclear. Perhaps cases were, in fact, brought in earlier years, dis-
missed without written opinion at the district court level, and never
appealed, thus leaving no record for later jurists. Unwritten opinions were
common at the time. Three of the four 1920 cases had been dismissed at the
district court level with nothing more than a judgment ordering dismissal.
Only the one case in which the district court had held that capital gains were
not income had a written district court opinion. What led these taxpayers in
1920 to bring suit, and then to appeal dismissals, when previous taxpayers
had not done so? Perhaps some of the four were emboldened by the
Supreme Court's Eisner v. Macomber holding in March of that year that
stock dividends were not income. Three of the complaints had been filed
after the Macomber decision.3 4 Perhaps the willingness to pay taxes had
subsided with the war.3 5 Maybe the stakes were higher since inflation effec-
tively increased the tax bill. For whatever reasons, the four cases appeared
in 1920.
C. The Supreme Court Decisions
The four capital gains cases each dealt with the sale of a capital asset
outside the ordinary course of business. Within that broad context, how-
ever, the gains arose in different factual settings. Merchants' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Smietanka concerned the sale by a trustee of stocks held for four years
under a testamentary trust that directed that "accretions of selling values
shall be considered principal and not income."'36 The taxpayer in Eldorado
Coal Co. v. Mager was a mining corporation that had sold its mine and min-
ing plant at a profit and distributed the proceeds to its shareholders. 37 The
plaintiffs in Goodrich v. Edwards38 and Walsh v. Brewster39 were individuals
who had made a profit on the sales of investments in stocks and bonds, re-
spectively. 4° The Court informally grouped the cases together by issuing a
gains drama including T.S. Adams, Advisor to the U.S. Treasury, and David Friday of the
American Economic Association. The Bureau is still active.
33. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
34. The complaint in Brewster v. Walsh was filed in February 1919, although the decision
did not appear until December 1920. The complaints in the other three cases arose in 1920
after the March 8, 1920, Eisner v. Macomber decision.
35. The National Bureau of Economic Research noted that during the war reporting of
income increased compared to the years 1913 through 1916. The Board speculated that such
increase may have been due not only to increased efforts of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
collect income, but also to individuals who "under the spur of patriotism, seem to have made
less effort to evade." 2 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INCOME IN THE
UNITED STATES 403 (1922) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU REPORT 2].
36. 255 U.S. 509, 515 (1921).
37. 255 U.S. 522, 526 (1921). The corporation did not dissolve because of unsettled tax
liabilities. Its affairs, however, were wound up.
38. 255 U.S. 527 (1921).
39. 255 U.S. 536 (1921) (reversing Brewster v. Walsh, 268 F. 207 (D. Conn. 1920)).
40. In taxing capital gains, the government had originally claimed that pre-1913 apprecia-
[Vol. 39
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short opinion in Merchants' Loan and resting the other cases on that deci-
sion.41 Merchants' Loan thus became the most important of the capital
gains cases.
The Court's brevity, coupled with its quick dismissal of taxpayer argu-
ments as "interesting and ingenious" 42 create the impression that the capital
gains issue was long settled. Contemporary evidence suggests otherwise.
After the publication of the district court opinion by Judge Thomas in Brew-
ster v. Walsh,43 which held that taxation of profit from the sale of a bond was
unconstitutional, the matter received a great deal of attention. The Yale
Law Journal, for example, viewed the question as being of importance equal
to that of the taxation of stock dividends decided in Eisner v. Macomber.
44
In a published comment the journal stated:
That the federal government has been collecting such taxes is known to
all; but the economists as well as lawyers have not been agreed as to the
validity of them, and a judicial expression of opinion on the point has
been eagerly awaited. Judge Thomas' decision that such profits are not
taxable has consequently aroused much comment both in financial jour-
nals and in the daily press.45
Opinions were divided as to whether such gains were constitutionally tax-
able under an income tax. The New York Times, which devoted many arti-
cles and editorials to the issue, was adamantly against the income taxation of
capital gains. It stated, for example:
The economic distinction between capital and income is one of natural
law, independent of either statutes or Constitutions. The Constitution
controls the procedures of Congress, but the Constitution and Congress
together would find difficulty in defeating natural law. A tax on capital
gains is a direct tax, and if the Sixteenth Amendment means anything at
all it confirms the principle that direct taxes must be apportioned to
population.46
tion was income, but later conceded that it was not. In Goodrich the original, pre-1913
purchase price of some of the stock at issue was higher than its sale price; the sale price,
however, was higher than the March 1913 value (March 1, 1913, was the effective date of the
statute). 255 U.S. at 534-35. In Brewster the original purchase price equalled the sale price
and the March 1913 value was lower than both. Id. at 537. In both cases, then, there was an
apparent gain based on the Revenue Act, which measured gain by subtracting the 1913 value
(basis) from the sale price (amount realized). In his brief and in oral argument, Solicitor Gen-
eral Frierson conceded that no gain existed and the tax had been "erroneously collected."
Federal Tax Only on Actual Profit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1921, at 3, col. 3. The "error"
indicates the general level of confusion concerning income tax. The Solicitor General had
argued and lost the same point in the corporate excise tax area in Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
247 U.S. 179, 183-85 (1918).
41. See Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 514-22 (nine-page opinion); Eldorado Coal, 255 U.S.
at 526; Goodrich, 255 U.S. at 534; Brewster, 255 U.S. at 537-38.
42. 255 U.S. at 521.
43. 268 F. 207 (D.C. Conn. 1920).
44. Comment, Profit on Investments as Taxable Income, 30 YALE L.J. 396, 396 (1921).
45. Id.; see Income Taxpayers to Suffer Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1921, at 17, col. 1,
reporting that the Treasury was warning taxpayers that despite the district court decision in
Brewster they must pay tax or be subject to fraud penalties.
46. Editorial, Taxation of Capital Gains, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1921, at 8, col. 4; see also
Editorial, Trading and Taxing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1921, at 10, col. 3. ("[i]t may be right to
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Many, but not all, legal commentators favored taxing capital gains. Even
those in favor of taxation, however, admitted that the issue was "not beyond
dispute."'47 Economists, too, were uncertain.48
Even the Government, which had been taxing capital gains for seven
years, admitted the unsettled nature of the issue. In his motion to advance
the Merchants' Loan and Eldorado Coal cases, the Solicitor General, Wil-
liam L. Friersen, stated that the issues of capital gains taxation involved in
the cases "are questions about which much controversy has arisen and
which [enter] into the determination of many pending claims. Their early
determination is of great importance to the department of the Government
administering the tax law." '49
The Supreme Court itself had issued contradictory statements, not only in
different cases but even within the same case. For example, in Eisner v. Ma-
comber the Court at one point approved the definition of income it had put
forth in earlier cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909. The
Court stated: " 'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include
profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was
applied in the Doyle Case (pp. 183, 185)." 5 0 Yet several pages later the
Court stated that "enrichment through increase in value of capital invest-
ment is not income in any proper meaning of the term."' 51 The Supreme
Court had been so inconsistent that one commentator concluded that "advo-
cates of either view ...can find aid and comfort in the language of the
Supreme Court opinions .... [H]e would be a bold man who would predict
with assurance, what the Supreme Court decision will be." '52
tax profits as profits, but it cannot be right to tax capital as income, nor can capital be made
income by statute").
47. Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and Some Income Tax Problems, 29 YALE L.J. 735, 739
(1920). Clark, who thought capital gains taxation would result in a fairer tax system, made his
comments in the context of discussing the stock dividend case of Eisner v. Macomber, which
was decided in March 1920. Others also used that case as a forum to discuss the broader issue
of capital gains. See, e.g., Warren, Taxability of Stock Dividends as Income, 33 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1920) (capital gains should be taxable because the tax can be passed on); Comment, supra
note 44 (district court opinion of Brewster v. Walsh should be affirmed; capital gains are not
income).
48. Professor R.M. Haig, for example, thought even unrealized gains should be taxed;
Carl Plehn, on the other hand, thought it was doubtful whether capital gains were income. See
infra notes 82-124 and accompanying text.
49. Motion to Advance, Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921);
Motion to Advance, Eldorado Coal Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522 (1921). The Treasury was
obviously concerned about the Brewster opinion. The New York Times reported that Internal
Revenue Commissioner Williams announced that the Bureau would continue to collect the
tax. He warned of "severe" penalties for false and fraudulent returns on those who omit such
gains. To Ignore Tax Decisions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1921, at 17, col. 2. Later The Times
reported that the Bureau warned of penalties for omissions for the "[h]undreds, perhaps
thousands, of taxpayers, [who] on the advice of lawyers" had not included capital gains in their
returns. Income Taxpayers to Suffer Penalty, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1921, at 17, col. 1.
50. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918); Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913));
see also Macomber, 252 U.S. at 212 (later sale of dividend shares at a profit is income).
51. 252 U.S. at 214-15.
52. Comment, supra note 44, at 398-99 (concluding that capital gains are not income).
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Despite the wealth of controversy over the capital gains issue, its unsettled
legal state, and the recognized importance of the issue, the Court declared in
Merchants' Loan that capital gains were taxable without seriously evaluating
the merits of the taxpayers' arguments. Why did the Court skim so summa-
rily over the diversity of contemporary opinion? What were those differing
views? An examination of the spectrum of contemporary thought on the
capital gains issue within the context of the Merchants' Loan opinion pro-
vides insight into the process that solidified a major pillar of our tax sys-
tem-the taxability of capital gains as income.
The taxpayers in each of the four 1921 capital gains cases presented
lengthy but basically similar arguments in their Supreme Court briefs. The
Government presented a brief only in the Merchants' Loan case and adopted
it for the other three cases. Both sides focused on the same issues:
(1) Whether the Income Tax Act of 1916 taxed capital gains realized from
sales that did not occur in the course of a trade or business; (2) whether
taxation of such gains was constitutional; (3) whether prior case law in-
cluded such gains in the definition of income; (4) whether the common
meaning of income included these gains; (5) whether trust law, which attrib-
uted capital gain to corpus rather than to income, was relevant; and
(6) whether British law, which did not tax capital gain from an occasional
sale or sales not arising in a trade or business, was relevant. 53
The Merchants' Loan Court focused on the first four issues, quickly dis-
missing both British law and trust law. Trust law was of "little value" be-
cause of the variable terms of trust instruments and the variety of state
statutes.54 British case law was also "quite without value" because it inter-
preted entirely different statutes. 55
As to the remaining issues, the Court determined first that previous
Supreme Court cases had defined the term "income" for purposes of the
Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909 as including capital gains. 56 Next, the
Other commentators also noted the Court's confusion. For example, Note, Is Appreciation in
Value of Property Income?, 34 HARV. L. REV. 536, 538 (1921) (footnotes omitted) states, after
examining prior cases:
From these authorities three conclusions seem justified. First, the Supreme
Court has made a number of loose and inconsistent statements some of which
must necessarily be repudiated. Second, the court has used the word "income"
in a sense broad enough to include capital increment. Third, the constitutional
question has not been decided.
The Note concludes that since the issue was undecided, the Court should hold capital gains
taxable because Congress considered them taxable. Id. at 539.
53. The government further argued that under Eisner v. Macomber the gains accruing to a
capital asset became taxable upon sale, the conversion into cash having separated the income
from the capital. Brief for Defendant in Error at 33-34, Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief, Merchants' Loan]. The plain-
tiff in Merchants' Loan had contrary arguments, in addition to those of the plaintiffs in the
other three cases, based on trust law and the trust instrument involved in the case, which
allocated capital gain to the trust corpus. Brief and Argument on Behalf of Plaintiff in Error
at 26-38, Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) [hereinafter cited as
Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan].
54. 255 U.S. 509, 521 (1921).
55. Id. at 521-22.
56. Id. at 517-18.
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Court stated that "income" had the same meaning under the various tax acts
passed under the sixteenth amendment that it had under the Excise Tax
Act. 57 The Merchants' Loan Court, therefore, held that capital gains were
included in the definition of income under all of the income tax acts passed
pursuant to the sixteenth amendment. 58 The Court noted that such a defini-
tion was the commonly understood meaning of income at the time of the
adoption of the sixteenth amendment. 59 Next, the Court observed that none
of the prior tax acts, including the Civil War Income Tax Act and the Excise
Tax Act of 1909, had differentiated between gains from sales in the course of
a trade or business and gains from sales outside the course of business. 60
The Court found unconvincing the taxpayers' "interesting and ingenious ar-
gument that this distinction is so fundamental and obvious that it must be
assumed to be a part of the 'general understanding' of the meaning of the
word 'income.' ",61 Such a construction, the Court concluded, would under-
mine the purpose of the sixteenth amendment. 62
1. The Common Understanding of "Income"
A major premise of the Merchants' Loan decision is that income should be
given its "common" meaning and not be defined by "the refinement of lexi-
cographers or economists."' 63  In stating this, the Merchants' Loan Court
merely followed the path provided in Eisner v. Macomber, from which it
took the phrase. As one contemporary legal critic phrased it, Eisner v. Ma-
comber had opened the "floodgates ofjuristic logomachy."64 The definitional
debates, however, had started before Eisner v. Macomber; only the word
being debated changed. Prior to the sixteenth amendment the arguments
focused not on the definition of "income" but on the definition of the phrase
"direct" tax. The delineation of the term was vital because the Constitution
required that a tax be apportioned if it were a direct tax. In determining the
meaning of "direct" the Court followed the general rule of construction that
words are to be given their obvious, common meanings; economic views
were specifically rejected.6 5
57. Id. at 518-19.
58. Id. at 519.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 520.
61. Id. at 521.
62. The Court did not explain why an exclusion of capital gains would defeat the purpose
of the amendment. Other exclusions, such as gifts, do not defeat the amendment. What the
Court had in mind, most likely, was its stance with regard to the corporate excise tax, which
was a tax on the privilege of doing business measured by income. See Revenue Act of 1909,
ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. In formulating its stance in that area, the Court held that to
exclude gain from the sale of assets was "inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction to permit us to suppose that it was
intended to be omitted from consideration in an act for taxing the doing of business in corpo-
rate form ...." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 183 (1918). For a discussion of the
excise tax cases in relation to Merchants' Loan, see infra notes 155-89 and accompanying text.
63. 255 U.S. at 519.
64. Note, Constitutionality of Taxation of Realized Capital Increase Under Federal Income
Tax Acts, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1921) (emphasis in original).
65. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618, 627-28 (1895). In Pollock
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Although the sixteenth amendment removed any need to apportion an
income tax, regardless of whether it was a direct tax, the first case arising
under the sixteenth amendment, Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, con-
cerned the terms "direct" and "uniformity" and not the definition of in-
come. 66 Not until Towne v. Eisner did the Court consider the meaning of the
word "income. ' '67 At issue in that case was whether a stock dividend was
income within the meaning of the Income Tax Act of 1913 and the Constitu-
tion. The Court held that the dividends were not income, but avoided a
fixed definition of the word.68 Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, said:
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circum-
stances and the time in which it is used." 69
Eisner v. Macomber70 opened the debate on the definition of income. De-
spite Holmes's pronouncements in Towne v. Eisner on the fluid qualities of
the word "income," Justice Pitney, speaking for the Macomber Court, felt
that a definition was possible. Although he noted that the relation between
capital and income had been much discussed by economists, Justice Pitney
stated: "we require only a clear definition of the term 'income,' as used in
common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the Amendment. ' 71
Chief Justice Fuller followed a line of precedent that "[t]he words of the Constitution are to be
taken in their obvious sense." 158 U.S. at 618-19 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 188 (1824); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838)). As to
whether Pollock did use the "obvious" meaning, see infra notes 256-72 and accompanying text.
66. 240 U.S. 1 (1916). The case arose under the income tax provisions of the Tariff Act of
1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 166. The Court held that the sixteenth amendment conferred no
new taxing powers on Congress. 240 U.S. at 17-18. Nor did the amendment eliminate the
difference as to direct or indirect taxes. Id. at 19. Rather, as to income taxes, it merely stated
that the power to tax incomes, which power already inhered in Congress, could be exercised
without apportionment even if the source of income made a portion of the tax direct. Id. at 18;
accord Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1916); see infra notes 256-57 and
297 and accompanying text.
67. 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
68. Id. at 426-27.
69. Id. at 425.
70. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Macomber, like Towne v. Eisner, dealt with whether a stock
dividend was income, but in Macomber the 1916 Income Tax Act, rather than the 1913 Act,
was at issue. The Court held that Towne v. Eisner controlled, because the conclusion of that
case effectively established that stock dividends are not income within the meaning of the
sixteenth amendment. Id. at 201, 205.
71. Id. at 206-07. The Court had initially resorted to common speech definitions in defin-
ing income for purposes of interpreting the 1909 Corporate Excise Tax Act. For example, in
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), the Court defined income in its "natural
and obvious sense." Similarly, in Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 414
(1913), the Court stated: "[W]e are little aided by a discussion of theoretical distinctions be-
tween capital and income. Such refinements can hardly be deemed to have entered into the
legislative purpose." Of course, such refinements were not necessary since, as the Stratton's
Independence Court noted, that tax was an excise tax, not an income tax. Id. at 416.
The Massachusetts case of Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917), provides
an interesting comparison with Macomber. At issue in Putnam, as in Macomber, was whether
a stock dividend constituted income. 116 N.E. at 906. The Putnam Court looked to the every-
day meaning of the word income. Id. at 907. The sources of this meaning included dictionary
definitions, federal statutes, and cases. Id. at 908-09. After examining these sources, the court
concluded that both stock dividends and gains from the sale of stock subscription rights were
income. Id. at 910-11. The Macomber Court, of course, reached the opposite result. The
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The Court considered dictionary definitions and concluded that the succinct
definition found in two cases construing the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909
sufficiently reflected the common definition: "Income may be defined as the
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case."
7 2
The Merchants'Loan Court was "entirely satisfied" with the Eisner v. Ma-
comber "common man" definition of income.7 3 The Court made no attempt
to locate sources of "common" knowledge, nor to explain more specifically
the meaning of the somewhat cryptic and decidedly vague definition. 74 The
taxpayers' briefs in Merchants' Loan and the other capital gains cases, on the
other hand, looked to three main sources for evidence of what they argued
was the common understanding of the term "income": (1) judicial law con-
cerning trusts; (2) court decisions under the British income tax laws; and
(3) prior Supreme Court decisions on the definition of income.75 These
sources, of course, are not common at all, but rather are specialized branches
of knowledge. A circular logic thus develops whereby the "common" is de-
fined by looking at the expert. 76 These specialized sources of "common"
Macomber Court specifically rejected the broad interpretation of income in Putnam that in-
cluded every item " 'which by any reasonable understanding can fairly be regarded as in-
come.'" 252 U.S. at 216-17 (quoting Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 526, 116 N.E. 904, 907
(1917)).
The Putnam case also held that the gain from the sale of intangible property was income
partly because the Massachusetts Legislature, in passing the state's taxing amendment, must
have approved of the federal income tax laws that taxed such gains. 116 N.E. at 908-09. The
court recognized that authority existed that contradicted the right to tax such gains. Id. at
908. Nevertheless, the court stated that whether taxability would ultimately be sustained was
not pertinent. What was relevant was that federal revenue officials asserted that such gains
were taxable and that the public "generally acquiesced." Id.
72. 252 U.S. at 207 (quoting Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415
(1913), and citing Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)). Both cases also
expressly used a common speech approach. See supra note 71.
73. Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 519. Interestingly, in Merchants' Loan the Court al-
tered the Macomber definition subtly by dropping the reference to Doyle. See infra note 170-71
and accompanying text.
74. In United States v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 212 (2d
Cir. 1918), Judge Learned Hand had also applied a common usage approach to the definition
of income under the Corporate Excise Tax. Judge Hand, however, attempted a more precise
definition than did Justice Pitney in Macomber. The difference, he said, between capital and
income "is between permanent sources of wealth and more or less periodic earnings." Id.
75. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 53-55. The taxpayer's
brief in Walsh v. Brewster stated:
The expression "common speech" used by this court does not mean ignorant
speech. Furthermore, the [Sixteenth] Amendment was adopted after the mean-
ing of the word income had been well established by the decisions of this court
and many state courts . . . and the decisions of the British courts, uniformly
holding that the proceeds of the sale of a capital investment are wholly capital,
though sold at an advance over capital cost.
Brief for Defendant in Error at 14-15, Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.S. 536 (1921) [hereinafter
cited as Defendant's Brief, Walsh v. Brewster].
76. See Irving Fisher's hypothetical interview with the "common man" in which the com-
mon man advises that experts should be consulted in order to define income properly. I.
FISHER & H. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION 192 (1942) [hereinafter cited as
FISHER]. Fisher also reported that although courts, legislators, and economists all "profess to
reverence the notions of the common man," no one has ever asked the common man what his
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understanding will be examined later. The present discussion is limited to
less legal, but more vague sources of "common understanding" alluded to by
taxpayers and courts, or what may be termed "more common common
understandings."
The taxpayers' briefs in the capital gains cases refer to the common man's
view of capital as a fund that produces income. The value of the fund, in
this view, may fluctuate, as may its form. The conversion of the fund from
one type of investment to another, however, never produces income-despite
a rise in value-because an ordinary man "if commonly prudent and con-
servative ... would regard and treat it [proceeds from the conversion or sale]
as still an integral part of his permanent capital." 77 The man-on-the-street
naturally derives his opinions from his own actions and beliefs, which, in
turn, are influenced by thoughts and actions surrounding him; his thoughts
reflect the world in which he lives. Thus, the "refinements of lexicographers
or economists" 78 do impact the common understanding, despite the conten-
tion of the Court in Merchants' Loan. Not surprisingly, then, taxpayers and
some courts often resorted to dictionary definitions. The taxpayer's brief in
Merchants' Loan, for example, devoted two pages to dictionary definitions,
all of which referred to the regular, recurrent, or periodic nature of
income. 79
concept of income is. Id. at 110. Two of Fisher's students, under his supervision, remedied
this situation by "put[ting] twelve typical questions to one hundred typical laymen." Id. at
110-14. The students received mixed responses. Nevertheless, according to Fisher's interpre-
tation of the responses, most laymen do not include capital increases in their conceptions of
income.
77. Brief for Plaintiff in Error (Taxpayers) at 19, Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U.S. 527
(1921) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief, Goodrich ]. The taxpayer in Eldorado Coal took
the same approach:
To speak, however, of an increase in a capital investment becoming a realized
gain only when the capital has been converted into money or some other kind of
property is a misuse of language. We refer in common speech to a man's capital
as having increased, regardless of whether he has recently converted it into
money or not. Converting it into money does not increase or diminish capital.
Keeping the capital in money, or investing it in some other property, does not
"change the essence" as this court said in Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, Co.,
supra. The careful investor considers income in the proper sense, as well as
market values, in making investments. He is not in the business of making a
money income from selling his investments for a profit, but if he is prudent he
may change his investments from time to time. Does such a change involve a
question of income? That has not been the popular understanding.
Brief for Plaintiff at 52, Eldorado Coal & Mining Co. v. Mager, 255 U.S. 522 (1921).
78. Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 519.
79. Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 54-55 (emphasis in original) reads
as follows:
In Webster's New International Dictionary under the title "Income" 4, income
is defined as
"That gain or recurrent benefit (usually measured in money) which
proceeds from labor, business or property," etc.
In Funk & Wagnalls' New Standard Dictionary, under the title "Income" 1,
the word is defined as
"The amount of money coming to a person or corporation within a
specified time, or regularly (when unqualified, annually)," etc.




These common dictionary definitions, as well as the man-on-the-street's
definitions of funds, were based on economic concepts. Economists, in turn,
agreed that their conception of income was similar to the common under-
standing. For example, R.M. Haig, one well-known economist, stated in
1921:
[T]he economist uses [the word income] in approximately the same
sense as it is used in ordinary intercourse. It has merely been necessary
for him to be more precise as to exact limits and distinctions. There has
been no revolutionary contribution to economic thought on this topic
since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. The economist and the
man in the street both use the term now as they used it in 1913.80
Despite such similarities, however, the problem areas in the definition of
income, such as whether capital gains were income, required the precision of
exact limits and definitions. Since the common understanding was incapable
of such distinctions, the Supreme Court's attempt to make these determina-
tions based on the common understanding was, as one commentator stated,
"a well-nigh impossible thing."' 8 1 The vagueness of common speech could
not provide the required precision, but, according to Haig, economics could.
The appropriate solution to the puzzle of income thus might have been to
graft the refinements of economists onto the core of common sense. Since
this common understanding was, at bottom, based on economic concepts,
the resulting definition could have been fairly coherent. Although the Court
consciously rejected this solution, an overview of then prevailing economic
views of income generally, and capital gains in particular, is still appropriate.
As part of the intellectual context in which the decision was made, economic
viewpoints inevitably influenced, albeit subtly, the Court's capital gains deci-
sion. Moreover, an exploration of the economic concepts shows that an eco-
nomic definition was nearly as elusive as the common understanding.
"That which comes in as the periodical produce of one's work, busi-
ness, lands or investments (considered in reference to its amount, and
commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or periodical receipts
accruing to a person or corporation; revenue."
After quoting the above definition, the taxpayer concluded: "The human mind does not recog-
nize, in a gain realized by a conversion, as an isolated event a gain of recurrent character, or a
gain coming within a specified time, or regularly or periodically." Id. at 55 (emphasis in
original).
80. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL IN-
COME TAX 1 (R. Haig ed. 1921), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION
54, 55 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959) [hereinafter cited as HAIG REPRINT]. On the
question of capital gains as income, however, the identity of the man-on-the-street's and the
economists' ideas is suspect, since the "exact limits and distinctions" of the term "income" are
the precise issue. See FISHER, supra note 76, at 191 (man-on-the-street interviews).
81. Comment, Profits from Sale of Capital Assets as Income: Taxable Under Sixteenth
Amendment, 19 MICH. L. REv. 854, 857 (1921). The Nation, for example, stated that the
layman's idea of income "is something that a man receives currently, and which he may spend
(or save if he can) without impairing his future." Taxing Stock Dividends, 110 NATION 356,
356 (1920). This definition is as helpful as the congressional definition of income as "gains,
profits, and income," a definition that, in The Nation's view, was "as enlightening and descrip-
tive as 'pigs is pigs.'" Id.
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2 Economic Concepts of Income
Theoretically, the relevant time for determining the meaning of the word
income was 1913, when the sixteenth amendment was enacted. 82 Concepts
current at the time of a court's interpretation of statutory language, how-
ever, may be intentionally or mistakenly attributed to the time of enactment.
In the case of the word income, the potential for discrepancies between defi-
nitions at the time of enactment and the time of interpretation is slight due
to the relatively short timespan between the proposal of the sixteenth
amendment in 1909 and the Court's interpretation in the capital gains cases
of 1921. As noted above, the economist, R.M. Haig, claimed that in fact no
change in the understanding of the term had occurred during that period.
Certainly, unanimity did not exist with respect to the proper definition of
income. In fact, the subject had received little attention before 1913.83 By
1920 more economists were addressing the matter, possibly due to prevailing
economic conditions.84
By 1921, however, no clear definition of income had been reached. The
capital gains as income issue was particularly troublesome. As Edwin Selig-
man, the noted economist and lawyer, said in his introduction to the printed
collection of the December 1920 Columbia Lecture Series on income tax:
At the very outset we are confronted by the question of what income
really is. To this many answers have been given. But no thoroughgoing
fiscal analysis of the conception has yet been made, and as a conse-
82. See the tax cases, such as Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 171, 173, 176
(1796), and Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 596-98 (1880), which look to the intent of
the framers of the Constitution when determining the meaning of "direct." See also 33 C.J.
Internal Revenue § 20, at 282 (1924) (words must be given ordinary meaning as of date statute
took effect).
83. As late as 1925, William Hewett, a professor of economics, still proclaimed that few
economists, except for Irving Fisher, had even discussed the issue. W. HEWETT, supra note
14, Preface. This opinion was an overstatement. The definition of income was debated, if not
decided, in 1920. See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text. To a certain extent the issue
was discussed even before 1913. See, e.g., Fisher, Are Savings Income?, 9 AM. ECON. A.Q. 21
(1908); E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14. Generally, Seligman defined income as a flow that the
consumer has at his disposal to consume without impairing capital. Id. at 19. He continued:
"However, the problem of defining income with such precision as completely to avoid any net
impairment of capital is one that almost baffles the student; and certainly no such precision can
be attained for purposes of taxation." Id. (footnote omitted).
84. The American Economic Association discussed the issue at its annual meeting in
1920. Excerpts from a paper presented by Professor Fred Rogers Fairchild were included in
taxpayer's brief to the Supreme Court in Walsh v. Brewster. Appendix to Brief for Defendant
in Error at 8-11, Walsh v. Brewster, 255 U.S. 536 (1921) [hereinafter cited as Appendix to
Defendant's Brief, Walsh v. Brewster]. The entire paper plus responses may be found in the
American Economic Review. Fairchild, Federal Taxation of Income and Profits, 11 AM. ECON.
REV. 148 (1921). Fairchild claimed that the "weight of economic authority supports the the-
ory that mere growth in value of capital is not income." Id. at 150. He acknowledged that the
present tax law treated such increases as income upon sale of the asset, but stated that such a
position "is clearly illogical, whatever otherwise may be said for it." Id. at 151. The 1924
meeting of the American Economic Association also addressed the issue. See Plehn, The Con-
cept of Income as Recurrent, Consumable Receipts, 14 AM. EcON. REv. 1 (1924). The Eisner
v. Macomber case stirred legal and economic interest in the definition of income. See infra
notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
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quence no two countries agree in the law on the subject. Among the
fundamental points at issue here are questions like the following:
Is income to be conceived of in terms of money, of money's worth, or
of mere psychic benefit? If income is a flow and capital a fund of
wealth, between what periods of time is the flow realized, and when
does the flow congeal into a fund? Are both realization and separation
necessary to the concept of income? Does income include the apprecia-
tion of capital? Are gifts to be considered income? The decision as to
these and many other similar questions waits upon a far more thorough
analysis than is found in the ordinary books.8 5
The best definition of income, of course, varies with the purpose of the
definition. Income may have one meaning when the purpose is to produce
revenue and another meaning when the goal is to produce certain economic
behavior. The definition also depends on one's view of equity, which, in
turn, hinges on one's political and moral convictions. Different equities may
compete with each other. At the time of the capital gains cases, economic
definitions of income reflected a variety of needs and views.
Classically, income was defined as "that portion of the stock or wealth,
which the possessor may annually consume without injury to his permanent
resources."8 6 Out of this definition came the concept that capital is a pond
or stock of wealth and income is the flow from that stock. Stated differently,
capital is the tree and income the fruit.8 7 This basic concept was subscribed
to by many American thinkers in the first quarter of the twentieth century,
when the U.S. income tax originated. For example, in 1911 Edwin Seligman
stated: "Strictly speaking income, as contrasted with capital, denotes that
amount of wealth which flows in during a definite period and which is at the
disposal of the owner for his purposes of consumption, so that in consuming
it his capital remains unimpaired. 8 8
From the concepts of flow and unimpairment of capital came the idea that
nonrecurrent receipts, such as gifts or inheritances, should be considered ad-
ditions to capital rather than income.8 9 Since these items are irregular, the
prudent man would treat them as capital. The concept of regularity or re-
currence, which often meant "merely periodicity," 90 was carried over to the
common man's concept, as shown in the dictionary definitions cited by the
taxpayers in the capital gains cases. 9 1 It was also subscribed to by some
85. Seligman, supra note 27, at vii-viii. The 1920 Columbia Lecture Series addressed legal
and administrative problems created by the income tax as well as economic issues. See also,
e.g., Comment, supra note 44, at 397 (distinguishing capital and income "is a task which baffles
economists no less than lawyers"). R.M. Haig also treated appreciation in capital as one of the
thorny income issues in his Columbia Lecture. HAIG REPRINT, supra note 80, at 63.
86. T. MALTHUS, DEFINITIONS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 238, definition 18 (1827, 1963
reprints of Economic Classics ed.).
87. The Macomber Court noted these concepts, but in the end looked to income as used in
"common speech." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206-07. The fruit and tree metaphor
reappeared in the assignment of income cases of the Thirties such as Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111, 115 (1930).
88. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 19.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Plehn, supra note 84, at 6; see R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 219.
91. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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courts. Judge Learned Hand, for example, in 1918 stated that the difference
between capital and income "is between permanent sources of wealth and
more or less periodic earnings."'92
The regularity requirement gave rise to another factor required by some
economists: Income could arise only from economic activity.93  Regular
gain, arising from economic activity, would be used for consumption. Irreg-
ular gain, from windfalls or casual sales outside the course of business,
would not be spent by the prudent person, but rather would be added to
capital. Irregular gain, therefore, was not income. This conception of in-
come existed in Great Britain before and during the time period when de-
bates over the classification of capital gains raged in the United States.
Thus, in Great Britain: "Casual, non-recurring or occasional profits arising
from transactions that do not form part of the ordinary business of the per-
son who makes them are accordingly held not to be within the scope of the
Income Tax. .... "94
According to some commentators the concept of regularity derives from
an agricultural economy in which wealth was based on land. Land rarely
changed hands; often, in fact, it was not freely transferable at all but was
entailed, passing from heir to heir. The land was the capital, and the regular
harvest from that land was the income. 95 Out of this early concept arose the
ubiquitous fruit-and-tree analogy in which the capital is the tree and the
income the fruit. From this agrarian view also grew the concept of the prin-
cipal or capital as a res itself. Increase in the value of the capital was not
income because the res itself, rather than any particular value, was the capi-
tal. Income came only from what the land or the res produced.96 This con-
cept meshed with trust law, which held that the land was the corpus to be
preserved for the remaindermen. Any increase in value of the corpus did not
92. United States v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 212 (2d Cir.
1918). In United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195 (1924), the Court
assumed the common understanding that periodicity was a requirement of income. Periodicity
was noted well beyond the 1920s. For example, the Third Circuit in excluding punitive dam-
ages from income stated: "Periodicity seems to be considered a factor [in income]." Conse-
quently a gift probably was not income even if the statute did not exclude it. Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928, 931 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), reh'g de-
nied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955).
93. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 68 (1938) (quoting several international
economists). Simons, of course, is the Simons of the famed Haig-Simons definition of income:
"Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exer-
cised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." Id. at 50.
94. R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 85 (quoting the Report of the British Royal Commission
on the Income Tax, Part I, § 8, 85 (1920)); see also Note, Some Techniques of Taxation in the
United Kingdom, 52 YALE L.J. 400, 402-06 (1943) (discussing current and historical taxation
of capital gains in the United Kingdom). W. HEWETT, supra note 14, at 110-53, speaks of the
taxing statutes under the sixteenth amendment as taxing only income from productive activity.
This, he claims, is the reason for excluding gifts and inheritances from income. Nevertheless,
he includes capital gains in the definition of income. Id.
95. E.g., L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 25-26; Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 9
AM. ECON. REV. 517, 524 (1919).
96. See, e.g., R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 40-41; L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 26.
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benefit the life tenant, who was entitled only to the fruits or income.9 7
Opposed to the res concept of capital was the quantum theory of capital,
in which the capital consisted of a money value equal to the original cost.
98
The following example illustrates the difference between the two concepts:
Adam Smith buys Blackacre for $150,000. Blackacre produces a ten percent
return in the form of rents, which are income to Smith. When Blackacre
appreciates to $200,000, Smith sells Blackacre and puts the proceeds in a
bank account earning ten percent, or $20,000, per year. Under the res the-
ory of capital Smith has no income on the sale of Blackacre. He has merely
changed the form of his capital from land to cash. His income consists
solely of the fruit of that capital, $20,000 per year. Under the quantum the-
ory of capital, Smith's capital consists only of the original cost of the prop-
erty or $150,000; the $50,000 increase in value is income to Smith.99
Commentators generally agree that the United States subscribes to the
quantum view of capital. Professor Lawrence Seltzer in his classic The Na-
ture & Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses attributes this to the
cheap availability of land, which made the buying and selling of it a common
occurrence early in American history. 1°° Wealth in America thus accumu-
lated in a manner far different than in England. In America, wealth came
from the frequent purchase and sale of land; in England, wealth derived
from rents on stable, long-held land. Seltzer also cites the large and frequent
increase in land values due to rapid business and population growth as caus-
ing Americans to view capital as a monetary amount. 10 1 Businessmen as well
as farmers began to meet some or all of their consumption needs from capi-
tal gains. Thus, the distinctions between ordinary and capital income
blurred, and the quantum or pecuniary view gained ascendancy.
10 2
In 1921 the quantum theory and its consequent blurring of distinctions
between income and capital gains may have been a widespread economic
view. It was not, however, the only view, nor was it clearly the predominant
view. Professor Fred Rogers Fairchild of Yale University, in his speech
before the American Economic Association's annual meeting in 1920, stated
his belief that the "weight of economic authority" supported the theory that
97. See L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 27-29.
98. R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 40.
99. The res theory assumes that gains from sales occurring in a nonbusiness context (such
as Smith's sale of Blackacre) will be plowed back into other investments and not consumed as
income. Under the British tax system, gains from regular sales, as well as gains from casual or
occasional sales if the transactions were entered into for profit, are income because the gains
will most likely be consumed. The property itself was never held as capital but was intended
for consumption.
100. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 29-30.
101. Id. at 30.
102. Writing in 1951, Seltzer said that American jurisprudence inherited the "tendency" to
view capital as a res and not a quantum from the British common law. Nevertheless, "when
Congress expressly included the gains from capital assets in taxable income, the Supreme
Court did not find this unconstitutional." Id. at 30. Seltzer may have put the cart before the
horse: the Supreme Court may have first held that the quantum or pecuniary view of capital
prevailed, and the Congress may have acquiesced.
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capital increase was not income. 10 3 He found "illogical" the notion that
capital changed into income upon sale and conversion into cash.104
Although some economists agreed with Fairchild, others, perhaps the major-
ity, believed that capital gains became income upon realization at a sale or
other disposition. 10 5
The Eisner v. Macomber case of 1920 and the commentary upon it re-
flected in the legal field the economic division over whether capital gains
were income. 106 The decision that stock dividends were not income despite
the rise in capital value reflected a res theory of income, whereas the dictum
that the sale of the dividend converted the capital into income reflected a
quantum theory. '0 7 Many commentators recognized the implications of the
case and used it as an opportunity to discuss whether capital gains were
income. 10 8 Although some noted commentators concluded that such gains
were income, the mere fact that the discussion existed indicates that the issue
was not settled.
The res theory was partially recognized by the Bureau of Income Tax
itself. For example, regulations explaining § 202(b) of the Act of 1918,
which dealt with gain on the exchange of property, acknowledged that no
gain was recognized if the property received was not "essentially different
from the property disposed of.'1°9 In other words, the capital was, to some
extent, the property (for example, the stock or bond) itself. Of course, to the
extent that a different type of property was received on exchange, the regula-
tions seemingly denied the res theory. 0
The taxpayers in the four capital gains cases followed the res or British
theory, which maintained a distinction between sales within the course of
business and casual or nonbusiness sales. For investors the property itself
(for example, the stock or bond, or any res) was the capital, whatever its
value. Capital was not limited to a pecuniary amount equalling its cost or its
103. Fairchild, supra note 84. Professor Fairchild's remarks were included in Appendix to
Defendant's Brief, Walsh v. Brewster, supra note 84, at 2-3.
104. Id.
105. See Plehn, supra note 84, at 10. See also, for example, the responses to Fairchild's
1920 speech, by Professor H. Stein and the accountant George 0. May. Federal Taxation of
Income and Profits-Discussion, 11 AM. EcON. REV. 160-70 (1921) (realized capital gain
should be taxed) [hereinafter cited as Discussion]. R.M. Haig went further; he believed that the
increase was income as it accrued. Realization was not necessary since for him: "Income is
the money-value of the net accretion to economic power between two points of time." HAIG
REPRINT, supra note 80, at 75 (emphasis omitted).
106. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
107. See id. at 210-12; see also R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 41-42; Isaacs, Principal-Quan-
tum or Res?, 46 HARV. L. REV. 776, 789 (1933) (for discussions of Macomber as reflecting the
res view of capital).
108. See infra notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
109. Treas. Reg. 45, § 1563. This regulation required a "change in substance and not
merely in form." Id.
110. If the section applies only to business property and not to investment property, the res
theory is not disturbed. See supra note 99. Taxpayers in the capital gains cases argued that
this distinction between business and nonbusiness sales was implicit. See infra note 11. Al-




market value as of March 1, 1913.111 A trader, however, buys an asset "not
... for his own use, but a house, or bond, to be sold at the market; his capital
asset in each transaction is the amount of cash capital expended from the
working capital of his business .... ,,12 The distinction between investor
and businessman is critical here, as it was in Britain, because the former held
his capital to produce income in the form of rents, dividends, or interest; the
latter used his capital to buy and sell assets such that the act of buying and
selling produced income in the form of the gains realized from the increased
value. In other words, the quantum theory of capital applied to the trader,
but the res theory applied to the investor.
Even if a quantum or pecuniary theory of capital did predominate in
America in the period 1909 to 1921, profit from the sale of a capital asset
was not necessarily income. If the sale were only a casual, occasional one,
the attribute of periodicity or recurrence would be missing. Income must be
a recurrent flow, and profit from "a sale is not a flow. It cannot be repeated,
the transaction being final. An income tax is a recurring tax and ought to be
confined to the tax period." ' 13 Thus, the question whether capital gains con-
stituted income was controversial even under the pecuniary theory. 14
The flow/fund and regularity concepts led to another factor considered by
some economists to be a requirement of income: expendability. According
to this theory, income is what a person can spend without impairing his
capital. If an item is recurrent, a person will see it as consumable; if the item
is not recurrent, it will be saved. Carl Plehn, for example, focused on
"spendability" as a key characteristic of income in his 1923 presidential ad-
dress to the annual meeting of the American Economics Association. 1 5
Connected with the concept of expendability was the view of income as a
"flow of satisfactions of intangible psychological experiences."' 1 6 Although
contemporary economic analysis recognized that income consisted of the
satisfaction of these wants, it also acknowledged that a "more definite and
11. Defendant's Brief, Walsh v. Brewster, supra note 75, at 7. The "regular recurrent
interest payments [on the bonds in Brewster], not the fluctuations of market values, are in-
come." Id. at 8. The income tax law set March 1, 1913, as the date on which increased value
might be viewed as income. Even this point, however, was confused. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
112. Defendant's Brief, Walsh v. Brewster, supra note 75, at 8.
113. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1921, at 8, col. 4.
114. Carl Plehn, for example, stated in his Presidential Address to the American Economic
Association on December 27, 1923, 3 years after the capital gains cases, that the gains of a
merchant or a dealer in capital assets are income because they are expected to reoccur, even if
irregularly. On the other hand, gains from "transactions outside of one's regular vocation or
line of business ... are of doubtful income character." Plehn, supra note 84, at 10. See supra
note 94.
115. By "spendable" Plehn means that the receipts "may be used to live on without direct
impairment of one's anticipated or expected income." Plehn, supra note 84, at 9. Plehn then
confusingly says that although gifts are spendable because they don't impair anticipated future
income, it is not wise to spend them. Rather, gifts should be used as capital. Id.
116. HAIG REPRINT, supra note 80, at 55-56 (citing statements made by Professor Taussig,
of Harvard, in 1916; Professor Irving Fisher, of Yale, in 1911; Professor Ely, of Wisconsin, in
1908; and Professor Seligman, of Columbia University, in 1914).
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more homogenous" measure than psychic satisfaction was needed."17
Money and money's worth thus were commonly used by economists to mea-
sure income. "18 Income consisted of the money's value of goods and services
received. Following this reasoning, the economist R.M. Haig concluded
that capital gains were income because they increase "the economic power of
the recipient to command satisfaction-yielding goods or services."" 19
Not everyone agreed with the money or money's worth theory of income
measurement. Professor Irving Fisher of Yale University held a contrary
view of income. If income consisted of the satisfaction of wants, then only
final satisfactions should be taxed. Money received for services rendered was
not properly income per se. Whether receipt of the money eventually cre-
ated income depended on what one did with the money. If the recipient
saved or invested the money, then no income resulted; wants had been post-
poned rather than satisfied. Only when the recipient actually spent money
would income result because consumption, not saving, satisfied wants.'
20
The expendability theory of income partially meshes with the theory that
capital gains are not income. The latter theory presumes that nonbusiness
capital gains should and would be reinvested because to spend them would
impair capital. To the extent that this presumption is true, the gains are also
not income under the expenditure theory. To the extent that the presump-
tion is false, the conclusions reached under the two theories differ. The ex-
penditure theory may be viewed as more accurate in that it is based on what
actually happens rather than on a presumption that may not always prove
true.
Another view of income involved the concept of social or national income.
National income measures the increase in goods and services on a national
level as opposed to the individual level. Under this view items such as gifts
and capital gains are not income because they do not increase the income of
society as a whole. Such items are merely a transfer of existing wealth from
one member of society to another rather than a creation of new wealth.
Sometimes this view was applied to the concept of personal income: even
though a person increased his net worth, by receiving a gift for example, he
received no income because no new wealth on a national level was created.
In the 1920s the exact relationship between national and individual income
was unclear. Although some commentators recognized that individual in-
come measured a person's increased wealth without distinguishing between
117. Id. at 56.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 62. Haig argued, however, that the prevailing method of taxing gains only at
the time of realization was unfair since gain had accrued over several years. Id. at 62, 73.
Professor Haig's article was written before the opinion in Brewster v. Walsh, 268 F. 207 (D.
Conn. 1920), holding that capital gains were not income, was published.
120. Fisher, Communication: Comment on President Plehn's Address, 14 AM. ECON. REV.
64, 65 (1924). Professor Fisher is the official father of the expenditure, or consumption-based,
tax now the subject of much discussion. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 76; N. KALDOR, AN
EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARv. L. REV. 931 (1975).
1985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
new wealth or transferred wealth and without regard to whether it increased
national income, the issue was not completely settled. This issue only added
to the confusion as to whether capital gains were income at the individual
level. 121
By 1921, the principle that the burdens of taxation should be distributed
according to a taxpayer's ability to pay had long been established.
122
Although exact concepts of how to measure the ability to pay differed, capi-
tal gains represented a definite increase in wealth and a correspondingly in-
creased capacity to bear tax burdens. Consequently, some people believed
121. See generally H. SIMONS, supra note 93, at 45-49. Simons, speaking seventeen years
after the Supreme Court's capital gains decision, perceived the income tax as focusing on the
individual's increased command of wealth regardless of source. More contemporaneously with
the Court's decision, the National Bureau of Economic Research, in its 1921 volume on na-
tional income, remarked:
One of the most serious difficulties in working with these data is the difficulty
of definition. Precisely what is the national income? Is it money, or commodi-
ties and services, or satisfactions? Is the National Income the sum of the in-
comes of individuals, or may an individual have personal income which is not
income to the nation?
BUREAU REPORT, supra note 32, at 3. The Bureau then stated that increased selling prices of
real property did not represent increases in national income, but did represent increases to
individuals. Id. at 48; BUREAU REPORT 2, supra note 35, at 249-50.
Professor Hewett, writing in 1925, stated that social income was merely the sum of individ-
ual income. W. HEWETT, supra note 14, at 48-51. He understood the 1913 Income Tax Act
to tax only the individual's share of the national income derived from business or commercial
activities, not mere transfers of already existent wealth, such as gifts. Id. at 48. Although
Hewett did not directly state that later acts also measured an individual's share of the national
or social income, he implied that this was the case when he said that those acts did not differ
significantly from the 1913 Act. Id. at 49-51. Nevertheless, he included capital gains in his
definition of individual income. Id. at 48.
122. This article will not re-examine the various theories of justice in taxation since, as
Henry Simons stated, a body of "extensive and exceedingly dull literature" has already been
written on the subject. H. SIMONS, supra note 93, at 2. Simons himself did, however, address
the issue in the introductory chapter of his book. Id. at 2-40.
Such notables as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill discussed the problem of justice in
taxation. The first of Adam Smith's four maxims of taxation is that individuals ought to pay
tax "in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NA-
TURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book V, ch. 2, at 777 (Random House,
Modem Library ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as THE WEALTH OF NATIONS]. John Stuart Mill
asserted that taxes should be distributed so that each individual bears an equal burden. J.
MILL, PRINCIPLES, POLITICAL ECONOMY, Book V, ch. 2, § 2, at 306-26 (Colonial Press ed.
1899). What these statements mean, of course, is unclear. Should everyone pay the same
proportion of tax (e.g., 10% of income), or should those with more money pay a progressively
higher rate of tax on the theory that the marginal utility of money decreases as the amount of
money increases. If one accepts the theory that the marginal utility of money decreases and
believes that everyone should bear an equal burden, then those with more money will have to
pay a progressively higher rate of tax. See generally W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 5-36 (1976) (policy discussion of progressivity and taxation based on
ability to pay).
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, a progressive income tax was generally accepted
(by those who accepted the income tax) as the proper measure of ability to pay. See, e.g.,
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1916) (progressive tax not unconstitutional);
Note, Progressive Income Taxes, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 443, 443 (1912) (progressive income tax
in Wisconsin not violative of federal Constitution in State v. Frear, 134 N.W. 673 (Wis. 1912));
infra note 323.
A progressive tax was not, however, accepted by all. See Hackett, The Constitutionality of
the Graduated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427, 441 (1916).
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that in accordance with the principle of ability to pay, capital gains should
be taxed under an income tax even if they were not income in a technical or
economic sense. 123
As the above survey of economic thought demonstrates, at the time of the
capital gains cases economists held widely divergent views on whether a cap-
ital increase realized from a casual, nonbusiness sale was income. Opinions
ran the gamut from not taxable to probably not taxable to taxable. In differ-
ing degrees various theories of income, such as the res theory, the expend-
ability theory, and the periodic nature of income, supported the nontaxable
view. On the other hand, those in favor of taxing capital gains adhered to a
quantum or pecuniary theory of capital. They believed that income mea-
sured one's increased wealth over a period of time, and capital gains in-
creased wealth. Moreover, even if capital gains were not technically income
in an economic sense, some believed that equity required taxation of this
source of ability to pay.
If economic concepts in fact underlay the common understanding of the
word income, the vagueness of that understanding in 1921 is not surprising.
Given the diversity of economic definitions, the resulting lay definition could
hardly be more precise. The Court's failure to apply an economic solution to
the definition of income problem was, therefore, not a missed golden oppor-
tunity. Economic solutions were not even necessarily appropriate since the
Court was not engaged in a theoretical quest for economic truth, but was
interpreting a statute and a Constitution. 124 An examination of legal con-
cepts of income might be more appropriate. Thus, the next two sections of
the Article explore the Court's examination of relevant legal issues.
3. Trust Law and British Law
The Merchants' Loan Court dismissed both trust law and British law as
irrelevant. 125 Both bodies of law, however, were long-established and proba-
bly more generally known than the more recent, technically complex income
123. Discussion, supra note 105, at 160. T.R. Powell took this view a step further. In
commenting on the "realization" requirement of Eisner v. Macomber, he stated that separation
of income from capital is not a strict prerequisite for taxation: "From a practical common-
sense point of view, there is something strange in the idea that a man may indefinitely grow
richer without ever being subject to an income tax." Powell, Income From Corporate Divi-
dends, 35 HARV. L. REV. 363, 376 (1922).
124. See, e.g., Powell, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Income Taxation, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 51 (R. Haig ed. 1921). Powell stated that economists were not so unanimous in
their theories that they could advise the Court as to "the one and only right definition of
economic income." Id. at 52. Furthermore, he stated that courts were not bound by economic
concepts. Legal and economic concepts of income could differ as they did in Lynch v. Hornby,
247 U.S. 339, 344 (1918), and Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1918), in which divi-
dends out of pre-1913 earnings were taxed. See Powell, supra, at 65 (taxpayer is not richer
than before dividend; only form changed).
Although economic and legal conceptions may vary, R.M. Haig warned that if the legal
definition "departs in any very fundamental fashion from the economic concept, injustices may
arise of such magnitude as to necessitate either the abandonment of the income tax or the
adoption of a constitutional amendment which will give a positive and comprehensive defini-
tion of income." HAIG REPRINT, supra note 80, at 66.
125. Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 521-22.
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tax laws and the confusing cases concerning them. The conception of in-
come embodied in trust law and British law, therefore, should have influ-
enced the common understanding of "income."
The Merchants' Loan Court dismissed trust law as irrelevant for two rea-
sons. First, trust law varied from state to state. 126 Second, the powers of
trustees varied greatly since they depended on the terms of the trust instru-
ment. 127 Although trust law did vary with the locality, most states allocated
gains from sales of capital assets to principal rather than to income.128 The
taxpayers in the capital gains cases argued that this common practice re-
flected the common meaning of income. 129 The government admitted that
under trust law capital gains were corpus. It argued, however, that trust law
was irrelevant because the Court had disregarded trust law in its Eisner v.
Macomber decision. 130
Whether the Macomber Court disregarded trust law is not clear. The is-
sue in that case was whether stock dividends were income for income tax
purposes.13 ' Under what was known as the Massachusetts' Rule, dividends
were allocated to corpus. Most states, however, held the contrary Penn-
sylvania or American view that dividends were income. 132 Despite the so-
called American view, the Macomber Court held that stock dividends were
capital rather than income. In Merchants' Loan the government argued that
the Court should ignore trust law as irrelevant to the capital gains issue just
as the Court had ignored trust law previously on the stock dividend issue. 133
The Merchants' Loan Court obliged. The Macomber opinion, however, does
not show that the Court disregarded trust law in that case. Rather, the opin-
ion offers proof that the Court followed trust law, or at least the Court's view
of it. The Macomber Court quoted approvingly from its previous stock divi-
dend opinion of Towne v. Eisner: "we cannot doubt that the dividend was
capital as well for the purposes of the Income Tax Law as for distribution
between tenant for life and remainderman."' 34
British law also supported the exclusion of certain capital gains from in-
come. Based on a res theory of capital, British law distinguished between
sales made in the course of business and those occasional sales made in the
ordinary course of changing investments. 135 Gains in the former situation
126. Id. at 521.
127. Id.
128. See U.S. Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 31-32. This practice reflected the
res theory of capital.
129. Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 53-55.
130. U.S. Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 31-32.
131. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 199 (1920).
132. U.S. Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 31-32; Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants'
Loan, supra note 53, at 36.
133. The taxpayer-plaintiff in Merchants' Loan also believed that the Macomber Court had
disregarded state trust law. See Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53 (state law
allocated dividend to life tenant despite the fact that it really was capital).
134. 252 U.S. 189, 202 (1920) (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)). Towne
v. Eisner dealt with the stock dividend issue under the Income Tax Act of 1913. See supra
notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
135. See discussion supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
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were income; those in the latter were not. British law also taxed only those
types of income described in five schedules. Income not listed in any sched-
ule was not taxed. 136 The law taxed only annual income, and the word "an-
nual" was interpreted to exclude the occasional sale.137
The Merchants' Loan Court dismissed this British body of law as being
"quite without value" because it was based on statutes "wholly different in
their wording."1 38 Presumably, the Court was contrasting the British
schedular system with the American system of taxing income "from
whatever source derived."' 139 Interestingly, however, the Encyclopaedia
Britannica in 1910 (one year after the sixteenth amendment was proposed)
described the British income tax as "a general tax on income derived from
every source."'140 The British viewed their system as comprehensive and de-
scribed it in words strikingly similar to the phrasing of the sixteenth
amendment.
The similarity may not be coincidental. Since the American income tax
was relatively new, the United States naturally looked to the experience of
countries such as England and Germany, which had longer histories of in-
come taxation.'41 Given American ties to Britain, the logical course would
be for the United States to look to British law. Consequently, in drafting the
sixteenth amendment Congress may have deliberately used a phrase similiar
to the British term and used it in the same sense. Thus, the absence of
schedules in the statutes drafted under the amendment may indicate no im-
portant difference in the intended scope of American versus British tax law.
Even if the Court correctly stated that the two tax systems were totally
different, the Court should not necessarily have disregarded English proce-
dure. In fact, the Court often looked to British law.142 That commentators
136. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 29.
137. Prior to World War I the British excluded from income all gains arising from isolated
or infrequent transactions. World War I, however, drastically changed the economy by creat-
ing numerous opportunities for nonrecurrent sales. Although the assets involved in such sales
were bought for speculation rather than traditional investment purposes, the sales did not
occur in the ordinary course of business. Since applicable British law taxed only recurrent
transactions, the treasury lost large sums of revenue. The Royal Commission on the Income
Tax attempted to remedy this by recommending the taxation of gains from any business trans-
action entered into for profit regardless of whether the transaction was a recurring one. Profits
resulting from ordinary investment changes would continue to be exempt from tax. Although
the Commission's recommendations were not enacted into law, the Board of Inland Revenue
began a successful administrative policy of taxing profits from transactions of a trading nature
even though such transactions were technically not a business. British practice continued to
exclude gains arising from a mere change in investment. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 28-29.
138. 255 U.S. at 521-22.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
140. 14 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 356 (1 1th ed. 1910). The Encyclopaedia also
gives a concise, but good history of the American income tax from 1862 to the joint resolution
proposing the sixteenth amendment in 1909. Id. at 358.
141. See Grossfeld & Bryce, supra note 14, at 238. Even Professor Seltzer admits that
American jurisprudence "inherited" the British view. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 30. Brit-
ain's experimentation with income tax began in the Napoleonic Wars in 1798. A regular in-
come tax was inaugurated in 1842. Germany, taking a lesson from England, began using a tax
in 1806. See supra notes 14 and 140 for some histories of income taxation.
142. In 1900, for example, the Court upheld a succession tax with copious references to
English precedent. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1900). The Court based its 1921
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would attach significance to the fact that England distinguished between
gains from sales in business and gains from sales of investments was, there-
fore, not surprising. Robert H. Montgomery stated that some people, basing
their belief on English and German precedent, predicted that:
[T]he United States Supreme Court, when it comes face to face with
this question [of capital gains], will draw a distinction between property
purchased to be resold at a profit and property purchased primarily as
an investment and will decline to include in the definition of income the
appreciation in the value of property of the latter class. 143
4. The Federal Tax Statutes and Decisional Law
The taxpayers asserted in the four capital gains cases that the word "in-
come" as used in the sixteenth amendment and income tax acts enacted
thereunder did not include gain from the occasional sale of a capital asset,
but did include profits realized from sales in the course of business. Prior
Supreme Court decisions, they claimed, supported this contention. The
Merchants' Loan Court quickly dismissed what it termed an "elaborate" ar-
gument that a distinction existed, or ever had existed, between isolated or
casual gains and gains in a trade or business.'" The Court first determined
that section 2(a) of the Income Tax Act of 1916 145 taxed gains from the sale
of stock. 146 Section 2 defined income to include gains from "sales, or deal-
ings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or
use of or interest in real or personal property . . . or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever." 147 The Court concluded that
the gain at issue arose from the sale of personal property within the meaning
of the section and that the comprehensive last clause of the statute certainly
included such gain in the definition of income as well. 148
On the issue of whether the investment gain was income within the six-
decision upholding the estate tax in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 348-49
(1921), largely on British Law as interpreted in Knowlton. Finally, in United States v. Field,
255 U.S. 257 (1921), another estate tax case, the government's "chief reliance" was on English
law "generally, but not universally" followed in this country. Id. at 262. The Court gave
credence to the English precedent, but distinguished it from the issue presented at bar. Id. at
263.
143. R. MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE 336-37 (1920). Montgomery ulti-
mately disagreed with this conclusion, stating that the "average person" considered nonrecur-
rent capital gain to be income. Id. at 337. Many other scholars also referred to British
practice in discussing American tax law. See, e.g., Note, Income Tax-Profit on Conversion of
Capital Assets Is Taxable Income, 16 ILL. L. REV. 68, 71 (1921); 33 C.J. Internal Revenue
§ 30, at 286 n.87 (1924). Even Magill in 1945 devoted twenty pages to British taxation of
capital gains. R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at 82-102.
144. Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 520-21. The district court in Connecticut, however, had
upheld the distinction just a few months earlier in Brewster v. Walsh, 268 F. 207, 214 (D.
Conn. 1920). See also Montgomery's earlier observation, supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
145. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
146. 255 U.S. at 516-17.
147. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
148. 255 U.S. at 516. The Court then determined that a trustee was a taxable person




teenth amendment, the Court said: "The question is one of definition, and
the answer to it may be found in recent decisions of this court."', 49 The
Court then proceeded to pick and choose from among what one contempo-
rary commentator termed its many prior "loose and inconsistent state-
ments." 50 The Court's choice of precedent presented the appearance that
the Court had long before settled the issue of whether income included gains
realized on occasional sales of capital assets. This appearance simply was
not true. Prior to the Court's capital gains decision, contemporary commen-
tators had recognized that "[a]dvocates of either view ... can find aid and
comfort in the language of Supreme Court opinions."'' Moreover, after the
decision they recognized that the Merchants' Loan Court had dealt summa-
rily with the issue. 152
A closer examination of the Merchants' Loan opinion illuminates the ac-
tual state of the law at the time of the decision. Although two prior Supreme
Court cases, Gray v. Darlington1 53 and Lynch v. Turrish,154 had held that
capital gains were not income under earlier income tax statutes, the
Merchants'Loan Court first looked to cases decided not under an income tax
statute but under an excise tax statute, the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909
(the Excise Act). 15 5 The Excise Act levied a tax on the corporate privilege
of doing business.' 56 The tax was calculated annually based on the "net
income . . . received by [the corporation] from all sources during such
year." 157 Consequently, the Court had found it necessary to define the term
"income" at a fairly early stage. In Stratton's Independence Ltd. v. Howbert
the Court had defined income for purposes of the Excise Act as "the gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined."' 158  The
Merchants' Loan Court approved that definition as supplemented by Eisner
v. Macomber, which had required that the definition "be understood to in-
clude profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."' 159 The
Court then cited three other excise tax cases: Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal
Co., 16 ° United States v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, & St. Louis Rail-
149. Id. at 517.
150. Note, supra note 52, at 538.
151. Comment, supra note 44, at 398; see also Note, supra note 52, at 538 (noting the
Supreme Court's inconsistent statements).
152. "The opinions.., contain no analysis of the objections thus summarily disposed of."
Powell, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Federal Constitution (pt. 2), 20 MICH. L.
REV. 135, 150-51 (1921). "Troublesome statements in earlier opinions that such a profit is
capital and not income were rejected [by the Merchants' Loan Court] as obiter dicta or as
confined to the interpretation of particular statutes." Id. at 150.
153. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63, 65-66 (1872).
154. 247 U.S. 221, 231 (1918).
155. Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, § 38 (1909). The Act was held constitutional as an excise tax
rather than as a direct tax in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 165 (1911). For a list of
excise tax cases cited by the Court, see infra notes 158, 160-63 and accompanying text.
156. Ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112, § 38 (1909).
157. Id.
158. 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913) (cited in Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 517).
159. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (cited in Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 518).
160. 247 U.S. 189 (1918) (cited in Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 518).
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way, 16 1 Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co.,162 and one case arising under the
Income Tax Act of 1913, Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe. 163 The Court used
the first three cases to support its contention that income included capital
gain; it cited the fourth case as authority for the proposition that the term
"income" had the same meaning under the sixteenth amendment and the
Income Tax Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 as it had under the Excise Act.164
The Court then stated that its 1872 decision in Gray v. Darlington, which
had held that a mere increase in value realized on a sale was not income, 65
had been "sufficiently distinguished" by the Excise Act case, Gauley Moun-
tain.16 6 Darlington was held inapplicable to Merchants'Loan because of dif-
ferences in the two statutes involved. 167 Finally, the Court disregarded its
1918 case of Lynch v. Turrish, which had held that appreciation was not
income under the 1913 Act. 168 The Merchants' Loan Court distinguished
Turrish on the grounds that the case dealt with pre-1913 appreciation, which
could not be subjected to the tax imposed by the 1913 Act. 169 In short, the
Court proclaimed that except for the irrelevant case of Darlington, the Court
and Congress had always included capital gains in income.
The first curiosity in the Merchants' Loan opinion is its quotation of the
Eisner v. Macomber definition of income. The complete definition as stated
in Macomber read: "'Income may be defined as the gain derived from capi-
tal, from labor, or from both combined,' [the Stratton's Independence defini-
tion] provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case."'170
The emphasized phrase, which was omitted by the Merchants' Loan Court
but much cited by the taxpayers, '7 1 is a critical phrase if it means that gains
are taxed only if they arise from sales such as that in Doyle v. Mitchell Broth-
ers Co. In that case a lumber company sold land from which timber had
been removed.' 72 Such a sale would be taxed even under an income tax
system that taxed only those gains connected with a business.173 The gains in
161. 247 U.S. 195 (1918) (cited in Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 518).
162. 247 U.S. 179 (1918) (cited in Merchants' Loan), 255 U.S. at 519, 520).
163. 247 U.S. 330 (1918) (cited in Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 519).
164. Merchants'Loan, 255 U.S. at 519.
165. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63, 65-66 (1872).
166. Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 521.
167. Id. The Court, in one sentence, also unceremoniously dumped all British precedent
because it was based on statutes that the Court characterized as "wholly different." Id. at 521-
22.
168. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1918).
169. 255 U.S. at 521.
170. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
171. Plaintiff's Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 73.
172. 247 U.S. at 181.
173. Determining whether assets used in a business should get capital gains treatment cre-
ates problems under current law. Is the sale of the asset so connected with the ordinary course
of business that the gain from its sale is ordinary, or is the sale extraordinary, a liquidation,
and therefore deserving of capital gains treatment? See, e.g., Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), and its progeny. Corn Products held that corn futures were capital
assets in the hands of a company that refined corn. Although the futures were not held for
everyday sale to customers, they were an integral part of the taxpayer's business. The assets,
consequently, were not capital.
[Vol. 39
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
Gauley Mountain and Cleveland, Cincinnati Railway also might have been
taxed under such a system. In both of those cases the taxpayer corporation
sold stock of a company engaged in the same business as the taxpayer.1 74
Consequently, the gain arguably was in the course of or connected with
business. 175
This view is supported by the fact that the tax involved in those cases was
a tax on the corporate privilege of doing business. To omit taxing even cas-
ual gains of a corporation would be inconsistent with the purpose of such a
tax: "Selling for profit is too familiar a business transaction to permit us to
suppose that it was intended to be omitted from consideration in an act for
taxing the doing of business in corporate form upon the basis of the income
received 'from all sources.' ",176 In contrast, the omission of casual gains
from taxation under an income tax would not contradict the general purpose
of the income tax. 177 Finally, one should remember that the Excise Act did
not tax income, but merely based excise tax calculations on income. Conse-
quently, fine distinctions of what was and was not income were not necessary
because the Excise Act could tax nonincome, too.
Also of interest is the Merchants' Loan Court's use of Gauley Mountain to
demolish the precedent of Gray v. Darlington.178 Gauley Mountain had
stated that Darlington was not controlling because it was based on the 1867
Act, which taxed incomefor the year, whereas the 1909 Excise Act based its
tax on income received during the year. 179 Two weeks later, however, in
Lynch v. Turrish, the Court rejected the government's attempt to distinguish
Darlington.180 The government argued that Darlington hinged on the 1867
Act's taxation of income "derived" in the preceding year whereas the 1913
Act at issue in Turrish taxed income "arising or accruing" in the preceding
year. The Court stated: "Granting that there is a shade of difference be-
tween the words, it cannot be granted that Congress made that shade a crite-
rion of intention and committed the construction of its legislation to the
174. Gauley Mountain, 247 U.S. at 190; Cleveland, Cincinnati Ry., 247 U.S. at 195.
175. Although Justice Pitney stated that the stock in these cases was held for investment,
Gauley Mountain, 247 U.S. at 193; Cleveland, Cincinnati Ry., 247 U.S. at 196, the government
had argued in its brief that investments completely unconnected with business were different
from assets tangentially connected to a company's general business. Powell, supra note 124, at
77. Thomas Reed Powell, Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University, com-
mented in 1920 that although this argument was not mentioned in the Court's opinions in the
Excise Act cases, the argument "furnishes a leverage" for those who distinguish between sales
by persons in business and those not in business. Id. at 78.
176. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. at 183; accord Gauley Mountain, 247 U.S. at 193.
177. The Merchants' Loan Court stated that upholding the distinction "would, in a large
measure, defeat the purpose of the Amendment." 255 U.S. at 521. The Court, however, did
not explain what the purpose of the sixteenth amendment was. Presumably, the purpose was
to allow the taxation of income without apportionment, regardless of the source. The amend-
ment thus eliminated the problem of determining whether the tax on an item of income was a
direct tax. See, e.g., Macomber, 252 U.S. at 205-06. The amendment did not, however, elimi-
nate the issue of whether the item was income. An income tax could only tax income. If
appreciation was characterized as capital, it could be taxed, but only under a direct tax and not
under an income tax. 252 U.S. at 217.
178. Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 521.
179. Gauley Mountain, 247 U.S. at 191-92.
180. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. at 230.
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disputes of purists."'' The great difference between Gauley Mountain and
Lynch v. Turrish is difficult to explain. Possibly the Court's different treat-
ment rests on the fact that Gauley Mountain dealt with the Excise Act
whereas both Turrish and Darlington dealt with an income tax. Neverthe-
less, the possibility that the two opinions merely reflect a divided and con-
fused Court cannot be discounted.
The third point of interest is the Merchants' Loan Court's treatment of
Turrish. The Court distinguished that case on its facts. Specifically, because
all of the appreciation in Turrish occurred prior to the effective date of the
Act it was not taxable.' 82 The Turrish Court, however, had not confined
itself to these facts. Rather, it stated broadly that the mere increase in value
of capital was not income.'8 3 As precedent the Court cited Darlington, a
case that in the Court's opinion had "not been since questioned or modi-
fied," 84 despite the fact that Gauley Mountain had been decided two weeks
previously. Turrish thus provided strong support for the belief that Darling-
ton was valid precedent and that capital gains occurring outside the business
context were not income.' 8 5
The case law, in short, was a morass of contradictory statements. The
income tax cases of Darlington and Turrish clearly did not tax capital gains.
The Excise Act cases distinguished Darlington and taxed capital gains,
although arguably not in a context outside the course of business. Ma-
comber contained statements that could be used to support either side of the
issue.
If judicial statements were confusing, perhaps clarity and certainty lay in
the statutory language itself. As the Merchants' Loan Court noted,'8 6 the
statutes clearly taxed gains from dealings in property or from any source
whatever; but could a statute make an item income simply by labelling it
such? In Macomber the Court had said no. The Court declared that the
sixteenth amendment did not permit capital to be taxed as income; it merely
permitted income to be taxed without apportionment. 8 7 Some commenta-
tors applied this reasoning to the capital gains issue, too: "It may be right to
tax profits as profits, but it cannot be right to tax capital as income, nor can
capital be made income by statute."' 88
Did either the statute or the amendment really include gains from casual
181. Id.
182. See Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 521.
183. Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. at 231.
184. Id. at 230.
185. Even Professor Powell, who was in favor of taxing such gains, recognized the force of
Turrish. Powell, supra note 124, at 79-81. Powell, however, noted that the gain in Turrish had
accrued prior to 1913. The government conceded in its Merchants' Loan brief that Darlington
governed Turrish because the statutes in both cases taxed income "arising or accruing" in the
year. It claimed that Darlington did not govern cases under the 1916 Act because that Act,
like the Excise Act, taxed income "received" during the year. Thus, according to the govern-
ment, Mitchell Bros. should govern. U.S. Brief, Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 28.
186. Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 516.
187. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 206.
188. Editorial, Trading and Taxing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1921, at 10, col. 13; see also
Kates, Profit Taxed as Income, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1921, § 7, at 2, col. 4 (questioning Con-
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sales of capital assets or were such gains excluded from income despite the
broad wording of the enactments? The Merchants' Loan Court said that the
statute taxed all gains from dealings in property, noting Congress's failure to
distinguish between business and occasional, nonbusiness related sales.' 89
Thus, the Court reasoned that no distinction was intended. This reasoning,
however, is too facile.
British statutes also did not distinguish between business and occasional
sales. Nevertheless, British courts had interpreted the statutes to exclude
occasional sales.190 Although the British statutes differed from the Ameri-
can ones,19' the British approach of distinguishing between business and
nonbusiness sales in practice despite the lack of such distinction in the stat-
utes was surely known to Congress when it framed the income tax laws.
That Congress had intended to follow a similar scheme is a real possibility.
Thus, Congress might have intended that occasional gains from nonbusiness
sales would be excluded from taxation, although no explicit statutory exclu-
sion existed because the common understanding of the word "income" con-
tained such an exception. The exclusion would be understood without
verbalization. This type of congressional reasoning is not an uncommon
phenomenon. Words truly are not "crystals."' 1 92 Language that is clear to
one generation may be unclear to another and need a gloss to make it under-
standable. For example, the Constitution sets forth the age and nationality
requirements that a "person" must meet to hold office. 193 Nowhere in the
Constitution is a distinction made between white persons and nonwhite per-
sons or between male and female persons. The distinction, however, so
clearly existed in the common understanding of who was qualified to hold
office that it did not have to be put in writing. 194
gress's power to impose a direct tax on profits from the sale of a capital asset under the "guise"
of an income tax).
189. 255 U.S. at 516, 520.
190. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 29.
191. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
192. See the statement of Justice Holmes, supra text accompanying note 69.
193. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (for Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (for
Senators); and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (for the President).
194. The taxpayers in Merchants' Loan similarly argued that the wording of the sixteenth
amendment achieves its meaning only within the context of the times. Plaintiff's Brief,
Merchants' Loan, supra note 53, at 62. The taxpayers argued that the sixteenth amendment
uses, not the words of the Act of 1867,
"gains, profits and income from whatever source derived," but merely the one
word "incomes," and added "from whatever source derived." The omission is
significant. Those who voted for the Sixteenth Amendment excluded gains and
profits as such and granted to Congress a power to tax only "income.".. . It is
difficult to close one's eyes to the fact that the language of the Amendment was
selected in the light of the decision of this Court in Gray v. Darlington. In order
that there might be no basis for enlarging the scope of the Amendment, the
words "gains and profits" were particularly omitted. The decision in Gray v.
Darlington became, therefore, as much a part of the Amendment as did the
language used in it.
Id. In United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940), the
Court declared that extrinsic evidence may be necessary to explain seemingly clear statutory
language. A discussion of various types of extrinsic evidence that may be used, as well as the
problem of weighing the evidence, appears in 1 B. BIrrKER, supra note 5, 4.2.2. Although
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As shown previously, the common understanding of the term "income" at
the time of the sixteenth amendment was unclear. 195 Prior income tax acts,
however, would naturally form a basis for any such understanding. Pre-
sixteenth amendment income tax acts had severely limited the tax on profits
from the sale of property. The 1867 Act involved in Darlington as well as
the ill-fated 1894 Act, for example, did not overtly distinguish between cas-
ual sales and business related sales. Rather, the Acts limited gains from
sales of real property to property bought and sold within two years. 196 The
two-year cut-off, however, implies a distinction between casual and business
sales. The fact that real property was bought and sold within two years
would indicate that the property was held for trade rather than investment
purposes, and the gain would, therefore, be taxable. Some legislative history
of the period indicates that Congress did not intend to change this rule con-
cerning occasional capital gain after the passage of the sixteenth amendment.
For example, in congressional debates on the 1913 Act Representative Hull,
while explaining the bill to the House, stated that although he could not
possibly explain every transaction, the task would be aided by "[t]he rulings
of the Treasury Department and the decision of the courts of this country
with respect to similar provisions of the old income-tax laws, and also the
English rules of construction, all essential portions of which will be em-
braced in the Treasury regulations."1 97 Since case law, trust law, British law,
and prior U.S. income tax laws all held that gains from occasional sales were
not income, Hull likely intended the 1913 Act also to exclude such gains.
Shortly after this first statement, Mr. Hull engaged in a conversation on
the floor of the House with Representatives Mann and Rogers concerning
the gain from sale of property. Much of that exchange is confusing. Men-
tion is made of taxable gain on sales, but that discussion often, if not always,
seems connected with a sale in business. 198 The exchange concluded with
Mr. Hull saying: "as to an occasional purchase of real estate not by a dealer
or one making the buying and selling a business this bill would only apply to
profits on sales where the land was purchased and sold during the same
year." 199
Such statements thus support the proposition that in 1913 Congress in-
tended to exclude casual capital gains from taxation. Was this intended ex-
the fluid quality of words requires extrinsic evidence to explain plain words, such exposition
may be carried too far. See Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223, 243-49 (1977) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's construction of "liabilities").
195. See supra notes 63-81 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Brief, Goodrich, supra note 77, at 82; R. MAGILL, supra note 14, at
103. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue apparently treated gains from casual sales as
income in the same manner under the early Civil War Acts. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2515 (1864) (remarks of Senator Fessenden). The 1864 amendment offered by Sena-
tor Fessenden would apparently have taxed as income only the profit attributable to the year of
sale.
197. 50 CONG. REC. 506 (1913) (discussion on H.R. 3321). Hull was an "author and com-
mittee chairperson" of the Act. 50 CONG. REC. 89 (1913) (statement of Hon. J. Hampton
Moore).
198. Plaintiff's Brief, Goodrich, supra note 77, at 78.
199. 50 CONG. REC. 513 (1913).
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clusion still present in 1916 when, according to the government and the
Court, Congress changed the meaning of income by replacing "accrued"
with "received"? 2° ° If the constitutional parameters of income are to be
determined from the meaning of the word in 1913, the year in which the
sixteenth amendment was adopted, then congressional intent in 1916 is con-
stitutionally relevant only to the extent that the meaning of income remained
constant. Even if constancy is assumed, 20 ' the 1916 legislative history is
inconclusive. The history only makes clear that some confusion existed on
the issue of capital gains taxation.
The fact that the provision of the 1916 bill governing gain from the sale of
property was repeatedly amended, sometimes in a manner differentiating be-
tween business and nonbusiness property and sometimes not, reflects the
confusion that surrounded the issue. The intent behind the numerous
changes is unclear to the modern reader and perhaps was unclear to the
legislators themselves. For example, on August 30, 1916, Senator Clarke of
Arkansas offered yet another amendment that stated:
[T]he profits realized within the year from the sale or other disposition
of any real estate purchased within two years previous to the close of
the year for which such income is estimated, shall be the basis for deter-
mining the amount of such gain so derived from such sale or other
disposition.20 2
In explaining his amendment, Senator Clarke stated that its purpose "was
to fix a date when the profits of an investment should cease to be income and
become capital .... This has been one of the troublesome questions in tax
legislation. ' 20 3 According to Clarke, the 1913 Act did not have such a pro-
vision and thus had not taxed gain on any sale of investment property other
than gain for the current year.20 4 The original provision of the 1916 bill
purported to correct the situation by fixing March 1, 1913, as the permanent
date for fixing capital. 20 5 Any gain after that date would be income. Ac-
cording to Clarke, however, this provision violated the rule established in
Gray v. Darlington that if real estate were held for longer than two years,
then the gain "merged in capital and it was not proper to fix it as in-
come." 20 6 Clarke's amendment aligned the statute with what he perceived
to be the Supreme Court's rule. When Senator Hitchcock asked how per-
sonal and mixed property would be treated under Clarke's amendment,
Clarke responded: "Profit not made on [personal or mixed] property during
the year or rather realized by the sale, would not be treated as income. That
200. For a discussion of the import of the different wordings, see supra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
201. The Merchants' Loan Court assumes it, as do some contemporaries such as R.M.
Haig. 255 U.S. at 519.
202. 53 CONG. REC. 13,407 (1916). This amendment, those amendments alluded to earlier
in the text, and the text of the original bill are all collected in the appendix to the plaintiff's
brief in Goodrich v. Edwards. Plaintiff's Brief, Goodrich, supra note 77, at 80-86.
203. 53 CONG. REC. 13,407 (1916).
204. Id.
205. See supra note 202.
206. 53 CONG. REC. 13,407 (1916) (statement of Sen. Clarke).
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is the universal rule."'207 In other words, Clarke's interpretation of Darling-
ton was that gains from dispositions of capital assets could never be income
unless the assets were bought and sold within the year; however, gains on
real property could be income if the property was bought and sold within
two years. When asked why the law treated real estate differently from
other property, Clarke responded: "That is the law. The Supreme Court of
the United States answered that question .... "208 He then proffered the
explanation that personal and mixed property change hands frequently,
whereas real estate does not. 20 9 This response suggests that real estate that
is bought and sold quickly is not a casual sale, but one in connection with a
business. In short, the response suggests the very distinction that the tax-
payers argued in the capital gains cases. At any rate, Senators Hitchcock
and Chamberlin expressed some confusion. 210 The issue was postponed un-
til the next day, but apparently never reopened.
211
Legislative history of the 1913 and 1916 Acts, as demonstrated above, is
inconclusive. Some statements indicate that nonbusiness capital gains were
not meant to be taxed, but such statements are few. Perhaps the most accu-
rate description of congressional intent is that Congress was confused and its
intent was ambiguous. If so, Congress was in good company; almost every-
one else, including the Supreme Court, was confused.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Supreme Court's decision on the capital gains issue could have gone
either way. Legal precedent would have supported a decision either for or
against taxation. Legal and economic experts disagreed whether taxation
was proper. Although the majority probably thought taxation of capital
gains was wise, they admitted that the issue was legally unsettled.
212
The contradictory judicial statements added to the confusion caused by
constant change in tax legislation. Stability in the tax system was needed.
The unsettled state was seen as detrimental to the economy. Business was
afraid to take risks because the law changed too fast for comprehension.
21 3
Confusion endangered the revenue system, which relied on self-enforcement.




211. This conclusion is based on a statement that subsequent debates "do not appear to
throw any light upon the intention of Congress." Plaintiff's Brief, Goodrich, supra note 77, at
86. I have not personally read the thousands of pages of debates, but I feel confident that a
plaintiff with a pocketbook at stake would have perused the debates fairly thoroughly.
212. Robert Montgomery's standard manual stated in its 1920 edition, prior to the Eisner
v. Macomber decision, that the 1918 Act rightly taxed capital gains, but whether the sixteenth
amendment was broad enough to cover such gains was not yet clear: "what is needed is an
authoritative definition of 'income.' It cannot be found in the Supreme Court decisions be-
cause there are too many differentiations and limitations to make it at all clear what a decision
will be in any future case." R. MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 253.
213. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 5355 (1921) (statements of Rep. Mondell); N.Y. Times, May
30, 1920, § 7, at 1, col. 5 (the author of this article, Otto H. Kahn, was a noted banker);
Editorial, supra note 12, at 12, col. 2.
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If people did not know or understand the law, they could not self-police
payment of the tax. As professor Seligman said: "Inasmuch as certainty is
one of the prime requisites of a good tax system, the attempt of our courts to
achieve certainty and to make it harmonize with constitutionality is one of
supreme interest." 2
1 4
That the Court needed to state clearly a position on the taxability of capi-
tal gains was apparent. The position that the Court would take, however,
was not apparent.215 Precedent did not point clearly in either direction. Ul-
timately, precedent proved indeterminative since the Court, as previously
discussed, did not make its decision based on careful analysis of legal argu-
ment. What tipped the balance toward taxability of capital gains was not
legal doctrine, but the political, economic, administrative, and constitutional
concerns of 1921.
A. Economic and Political Concerns
The economic state of the union in 1921 was dismal. The post-World War
I boom, which slowed in the last quarter of 1920, had become a depression
by 1921 .216 Tax revenues were decreasing despite high rates. Governmental
expenses, on the other hand, remained high.217 The costs of World War I,
especially the need to retire war debts, were already enormous, but pressures
existed to increase governmental expenditures further in the form of a sol-
dier's bonus. 218 In addition, troubled agriculture and transportation indus-
tries required governmental assistance. 219 Both D.F. Houston, the outgoing
Secretary of the Treasury under the Wilson Administration, and Secretary
Mellon, beginning under the Republican Harding Administration, recog-
nized in varying degrees that the government needed to contain expenditures
and readjust tax rates. 220 The public believed that high taxes crippled indus-
try and business because they caused the rich to invest their money in tax-
214. Seligman, supra note 27, at ix. The need for certainty in a tax system was one of
Adam Smith's maxims. See THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 122, at 778.
215. Thomas Reed Powell, Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University, was
convinced, based on Eisner v. Macomber, that the majority of the Court believed gain from sale
of capital assets was income. Powell, supra note 124, at 82. Other commentators were not so
sure. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
216. The Depression lasted until 1922. See supra note 10. See generally W.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE PROSPEROUS DECADE 130-79 (1958).
217. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
218. E.g., Brown, Why Our Budget System Will Not Reduce Taxes, 112 NATION 789
(1921); Editorial, The Treasury's Dilemma, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1920, at 6, col. 2 (Treasury's
situation "so serious" that it was trying to collect "slow assets" from foreign governments);
Treasury to Urge Revision of Taxes But Sees No Cut, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1920, at I, col. 1;
Excess Profits Tax or Sales Tax, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1920, at 1, col. 5.
219. The Transportation Act of 1920 provided some governmental relief to railroads and
imposed a corresponding burden on the government. In 1921 President Harding proposed
additional relief for railways. See, e.g., Harding Proposes War Finance Board & Fund Railroad
Debt, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1921, at 1, col. I.
220. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 34, 47. The Nation editorialized that the
only way to reduce taxes was to reduce the arms build-up. It claimed that in 1921 68% of the
budget went for expenses of past wars (pensions, war debt, etc.), 20% went for future wars,
and only 12% for nonmilitary purposes. Since Congress already had trimmed nonmilitary
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exempt securities instead of in private industry.2 21 In addition, the high
rates prevented transactions in capital assets because people did not want to
pay the tax on the realized capital gains, which the Treasury required even
though the law was arguably unclear on the issue. 222 Consequently, prop-
erty was not being used in the most efficient and profitable manner. Newspa-
pers, businessmen, and Congress recognized and complained of this "lock-
in" factor, or freezing of capital.223
The flow of capital to tax-exempt securities, and the lock-in effect both
decreased revenue receipts and depressed an already stagnating economy. A
Supreme Court decision holding that capital gains were not taxable had the
potential to encourage business activity. Without a threat of a tax upon sale,
property would change hands more readily. Theoretically, property would
ultimately rest in the hands of those who could use it most productively.
Increased productivity would then create taxable income, which would lead
to revenue for government.
The exemption of capital gains, however, would not necessarily have been
a panacea either for the cash-hungry Treasury or for business; in reality it
might have been disastrous. A holding that capital gains did not constitute
income would have decreased a tax base that already had been precipitously
reduced by the huge flow of money into tax-exempt securities. The British
experience in World War I had shown that an exemption for capital gains
could reduce the tax base dramatically. The war had created vast opportuni-
ties for sporadic gains from sales of speculative property. Since these spo-
expenditures, the only way to reduce the budget was to reduce military expenditures. Why
Our Budget System Will Not Reduce Taxes, 112 NATION 789 (1921).
The cry for reduced armaments was not unique to The Nation. The New York Times, in an
editorial urging the United States to lend money to Germany, proclaimed:
Millions lack food while billions are spent for powder and bullets .... It is little
to say that "defense" expenditures are unproductive. They are destructive.
Men must live before they can use weapons, and the hungriest nations must be
fed first .... Lloyd George last week set the example of heroic reduction of
armament expenses. Others must imitate that example if the world is to be
saved from famine and if civilization is to be preserved.
N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1920, § 2, at 2, col. 3, at 3, col. 1.
221. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 137; supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text;
and innumerable references in congressional hearings and debates on 1921 Revenue Act.
222. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
223. See Editorial, supra note 12, at 12, col. 1; supra note 26 and accompanying text. The
lock-in or freezing effect may have been exaggerated. The National Bureau of Economic Re-
search (the Bureau) stated that many property owners "doubtless" failed to report profits from
the sale of property. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 32, at 44-45. If the Bureau's report was
accurate, then fewer assets were frozen than were being reported. Perhaps the complaints
about the tax rates indicated merely a fear that the Bureau of Internal Revenue would discover
and tax the sale. See BUREAU REPORT 2, supra note 35, at 254. The Bureau, however, further
stated that taxes "were an effective deterrent from making realizing sales." Id. On the same
page the Bureau second-guessed itself once again by noting that tax on capital gains was often
avoided via gift and subsequent sale. For example, if a taxpayer gave securities to a son who
then sold the stock, the son did not realize taxable income on the sale since his basis in the
stock was the fair market value of the stock at the time of the gift. Id. at 254-55. Section
202(2) of the 1921 Revenue Act closed this loophole by providing that the donee's basis for a
gift was the donor's basis. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929), upheld the provision, which is
embodied in § 1015 of the current Internal Revenue Code. Section 1015(d) provides for an
increase in basis to reflect gift tax paid on net appreciation. I.R.C. § 1015(d) (West 1982).
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radic sales were excluded from tax, the British Treasury lost large amounts
of revenue. Consequently, in 1920 the Royal Commission on the Income
Tax recommended that gain from any profit-seeking transaction be taxed,
regardless of whether the transaction was isolated.224 In essence, the Com-
mission broadened the scope of business income while maintaining the ex-
emption for gain on a mere change of investment. Although such a view of
exempt capital gains could have been adopted by the Supreme Court, it
would have created much ambiguity and litigation. Moreover, it would have
narrowed the tax base.
The government could not afford a further narrowing of the tax base, par-
ticularly in light of the Court's decision in Eisner v. Macomber, which had
held that stock dividends were not income. The Macomber decision cost the
Treasury between twenty-five and 105 million dollars that the government
had to pay in refunds for the years 1918 and 1919.225 If the ultimate sale of
the stock dividends were not taxable, the Treasury would fail to recoup the
refunded $105 million.226 More importantly, the tax base would be forever
narrowed as more and more corporations would give stock, instead of cash,
dividends. 227
The Evans v. Gore228 decision had also narrowed the tax base. Although
the issue in Gore was limited to whether the salaries of federal judges were
taxable, the opinion stated broadly that the sixteenth amendment had not
enlarged Congress's taxing power.2 29 Consequently, salaries paid by state
and municipal governments were not taxable. 230 The Court's statement in
Gore effectively resolved a question that had been debated since the amend-
ment was first proposed. 23 1 As one commentator noted, this broad holding
would further encourage the flow of capital into tax-exempt securities, thus
seriously impairing the tax-base.
232
224. See supra note 137; ROYAL COMM'N ON THE INCOME TAX 90-91 (1920) (cited in L.
SELTZER, supra note 5, at 29). The recommendations were never enacted into law, but were
effected administratively by the Board of Inland Revenue. L. SELTZER, supra note 5, at 29.
225. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 36 (Treasury paid $35 million in refunds for 1918
and tax income would probably be reduced by $70 million for the year 1919).
226. The Treasury's report further stated that despite the refunds most Treasury experts
expected the net loss to be less than $25 million dollars. Id. These estimates, however, were
based on the assumption that taxable income would result when the stock dividends were
eventually sold. See Secretary Houston's Tax Proposals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1920, at 12, col.
3; see also 23 NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 1920, at 60 (letter of Charles Clark in which he ex-
pressed hopes that Macomber's dictum settled the issue of taxing the gain upon sale of the
dividend). The exact amount of the revenue loss caused by Macomber was debated. Small
Government Loss From Stock-Dividend Decision, LITERARY DIG., Apr. 17, 1920, at 159 (re-
ports exaggerated amount of loss).
227. See, e.g., Sees Billion Tax Loss, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1920, at 21, col. 2. After the
Macomber decision the number of corporations issuing stock dividends increased. See, e.g.,
Zuckerman, Are Stock Dividends Income?, 28 J. POL. ECON. 591, 598 (1920).
228. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
229. Id. at 260-62.
230. Comment, Further Limitations Upon Federal Income Taxation, 30 YALE L.J. 75, 76-
77 (1920).
231. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. at 255 (Court stated in dictum that income from state and
municipal bonds not taxable); see Comment, supra note 230, at 76.
232. Id. at 80; see supra note 227.
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Theoretically, the reduction in a tax base caused by a capital gains exclu-
sion could be offset by taxing larger numbers of people. In 1920 Congress
easily could have expanded coverage since most people were not taxed.233 A
lowering of the exemption amount would have subjected a vast portion of
the population to income tax for the first time. Taxing a larger number of
people on a narrower tax base could net the same amount of revenue as
taxing fewer people on a more comprehensive tax base. Politically, however,
this solution was dangerous. Although the majority of people did not pay
income tax, they paid a variety of miscellaneous taxes. 234 Both parties had
run the 1920 presidential campaign on platforms that promised tax relief for
the protesting populace.235 The general public probably would not have
thought that subjecting people to the income tax for the first time constituted
tax relief. Moreover, such a move would have done little or nothing to pro-
vide relief in the form of reduced rates to those people who were already
paying income taxes at rates they considered burdensome.
The group clamoring for lowered rates was small, but it consisted of many
wealthy and politically powerful individuals, including the Secretary of the
Treasury, Mr. Mellon. Furthermore, contemporary opinion was that tax
rates needed to be reduced in order to lift the country out of the depression.
Lowered rates would reverse the flow of capital from tax-exempt securities
back into profitable business investments, 236 stimulate the economy, and
eventually produce equal or greater revenues despite lower tax rates. In the
meantime, however, Congress would need another source of revenue to re-
place the revenues lost by the lowered rates. The miscellaneous taxes men-
tioned above provided a possible source, but subjecting more of the public to
the income tax while raising other taxes might have been unacceptable
politically. 237
233. See supra note 18.
234. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 20. Representative Bacharach stated that Harding won the election in
part because people wanted efficient economic management of government "with a consequent
rearrangement and reduction of Federal taxation which would permit an early return of busi-
ness prosperity and a more equitable distribution of the burden of Federal taxes." 61 CONG.
REC. 5135 (1921). Representative Joseph Fordney of Michigan, Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, reiterated the mood of the public when he introduced the 1921 revenue
bill: "The sentiment of the country is that the people should be relieved, so far as possible,
from the heavy burdens of taxation." 61 CONG. REC. 5125 (1921). Both parties had pledged
lower taxes. See, e.g., Editorial, Congress on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1921, at 12, col. 1.
The question was simply which group would bear the brunt of the taxes. The battle concern-
ing the 1921 tax legislation was whether the bill helped the rich or the poor. See, e.g., Demo-
crats Prepare to Fight Bill, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1921, at 3, col. 3, stating that the bill was a
rich man's bill because individuals with incomes ranging from $5,000 to $66,000 a year would
pay the same taxes as under existing tax laws, whereas persons with incomes exceeding
$66,000 would receive reductions ranging from 1% to 50%. The commonly perceived differ-
ence between the parties was that Republicans shifted tax so as not to hurt big business,
whereas Democrats believed in allocating the tax burden according to ability to pay. 61 CONG.
REC. 5131 (1921) (remarks of Mr. Garner).
236. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
237. Part of the political struggle during the debates on the Revenue Act of 1921 related to
relief from the miscellaneous taxes. Senator Smoots's proposed amendment to the revenue bill
would have repealed the following miscellaneous war taxes: the excise taxes; luxury taxes;
stamp taxes; capital stock tax; transportation, telegraph, and insurance taxes; the taxes on soft
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The Supreme Court Justices must have been aware of the public demands
for lower income and miscellaneous taxes and the congressional need for
more revenue. The connection between the government's need and the capi-
tal gains cases was obvious. Many contemporary accounts linked the two,
and some observers implied that the need for revenue was a factor in the
Court's decision to tax capital gains.238 The New York Times noted, for
example, that if the Court had not held capital gains taxable, the Treasury
"could scarcely have met" the large demands upon it without legislative
relief.239
Furthermore, an exemption for capital gains would narrow the tax base.
Recent British experience had shown how difficult it was to include gain in
taxable income when distinctions existed between occasional and business
capital gains. The more gain that was excluded, the more the tax base was
eroded. So long as the tax base was narrow, it would be difficult, if not
impossible to lower rates on taxable income without increasing other taxes
or subjecting more citizens to the income tax. Thus, an exemption for capi-
tal gains would neither satisfy the political clamor for tax relief nor provide
the spur to general economic growth that a general rate reduction would.
Finally, a holding that the taxation of capital gains was unconstitutional
would permanently limit Congress's ability to meet revenue needs. The eco-
nomic and industrial changes wrought by World War I and its aftermath
demonstrated that Congress needed flexibility. A decision upholding the
taxability of capital gains would provide Congress with the requisite power
to meet changing economic conditions. It would maintain a theoretically
broad tax base and allow Congress to exclude or prefer capital gains as eco-
nomic conditions required. The Revenue Act of 1921, in fact, used this flexi-
bility by including capital gains in taxable income, but taxing them at lower
than normal rates in order to mitigate the "lock-in" effect on capital asset
transactions. 240
Thus, the Supreme Court had strong political and economic motives to
tax capital gains. The tax ostensibly would help meet immediate revenue
demands. Although a tax on these gains might have an adverse effect on the
drinks, ice cream, and cosmetics; the taxes on admissions and dues; and all of the other "57
Varieties of obnoxious discriminatory forms of taxation." 61 CONG. REC. 5891 (1921) (state-
ment of Sen. Smoots). Senator Smoots would have substituted a sales tax for these repealed
taxes. Whether that substitution would have actually provided tax relief is another question.
The New York Times discussed Senator Smoots's plan in Turning to the Sales Tax, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3, 1921, at 18, col. 1.
Senator Simmons charged that the populace had had no relief from the miscellaneous taxes,
and stated that to the contrary, Secretary of the Treasury Mellon's tax plan increased miscella-
neous taxes in order to recover revenue that would be lost through his proposed income tax
cuts by means of other miscellaneous taxes. 61 CONG. REc. 5892-93 (1921).
238. See, e.g., Note, supra note 143, at 72 (a decision that capital gains were not income
"would have destroyed a very large source of revenue" greatly needed by the government).
239. Editorial, supra note 12, at 12, col. 2. "Naturally it [the Court] prefers the decisions
in which it has found income taxable." Id. col. 3. The article also noted, however, that the
Treasury lost 100 million dollars because the Court had held that the basis for computing gain
would be the higher of cost or 1913 value. Id. col. 2.
240. 1921 Revenue Act, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
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economy by preventing sales, this argument was more subtle than was the
Treasury's appetite for immediate revenue. 24 1
B. Balance of Power and Administrative Concerns
The balance of power among the three branches of the federal government
is a cornerstone of our Constitution. Normally the balance is a delicate one.
Since "the power to tax involves the power to destroy, '242 one would expect
the system of checks and balances to be especially strong in the tax area.
Somewhat paradoxically, however, this area is one in which the judiciary has
ceded much of its power of judicial review. The Court has so far abdicated
its power that in a constitutional sense there is practically no check on either
executive or congressional power other than a general sense that the taxing
power must be exercised for the general welfare. 243 The capital gains cases
of 1921 were a pivotal point in the cession of this judicial power.
The power to tax is Janus-faced. It is a destructive power, but it is also
constructive, for without the power to tax a government cannot long survive.
From its inception the United States has grappled with these two aspects of
the taxing power in an attempt to strike a viable and democratic balance. In
the Articles of Confederation, the states reserved to themselves all taxing
powers. Since the War of Independence had been caused in part by oppres-
sive taxation, the reservation of the taxing power by the states was not sur-
prising. The failure to grant any taxing powers to the federal government,
however, proved fatal. The Constitution remedied this weakness. Article I
provided Congress with the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises."' 244 The only limitations upon this power were that "direct"
taxes had to be apportioned among the states according to population 245 and
that "all duties, imposts and excises [had to] be uniform throughout the
United States."' 24 6 The Constitution did not define "direct" or "uniform."
Debates at the Constitutional Convention and the ratifying state conventions
were vague as to those terms and did little to clarify them.247
In Hylton v. United States the Court considered whether a tax on carriages
was a direct tax and, therefore, had to be apportioned. 248 Alexander Hamil-
ton argued the case for the government, 24 9 and three of the four judges de-
ciding the case were members of the Constitutional Convention.250 The
241. See Note, supra note 143, at 72; Comment, supra note 44, at 400. Congress also rec-
ognized this tension and provided some relief in the 1921 Revenue Act. See supra note 240
and accompanying text.
242. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
243. See, e.g., cases listed in I B. BITrKER, supra note 5, 1.2.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
245. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 & § 9, cl. 4.
246. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
247. See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 595-97 (1881); E. SELIGMAN, supra
note 14, pt. 2, ch. V; Riddle, The Supreme Court's Theory of a Direct Tax, 15 MIcH. L. REV.
566, 566 (1917).
248. 3 U.S. 171, 172, 3 Dall. 171, 172 (1796).
249. Id.
250. Justices Wilson, Paterson, and Chase were members of the Constitutional Convention.
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Court held that the tax was not a direct tax and stated in dictum that per-
haps only poll taxes and land taxes were "direct" taxes. 251 The Court ap-
proached the task of defining "direct" from a practical standpoint, rather
than from a technical or economic one. If a tax could not be practicably
apportioned, then it was an indirect tax. To hold otherwise would result in
some items being completely untaxable, and the Court reasoned that it was
"obvious the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that Congress
should possess full power over every species of taxable property, except ex-
ports." 2 52 By using a practical rather than a technical or economic ap-
proach to the meaning of the term "direct," the Court interpreted
Congress's taxing power expansively. Well-aware of the inherent flaw of the
Articles of Confederation, 253 the Justices viewed the Constitution as
"vest[ing] in Congress plenary authority in all cases of taxation. ' 254 Justice
Chase went so far in deferring to Congress as to state that even if the
Supreme Court were found to have the power to declare a congressional act
invalid on constitutional grounds, he would "never exercise it, but in a very
clear case."
255
During the period between the Hylton case in 1796 and the Pollock v.
Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. 256 case in 1895, the Supreme Court had several
opportunities to consider whether a particular tax was a direct tax and,
therefore, required apportionment. In each case the Court took a position
consistent with Hylton. Congressional power to tax was viewed expansively,
and none of the taxes, including the income tax of 1864 at issue in Springer v.
United States, was held to be direct. 257
The Fourth Justice, Iredell, had been a member of the North Carolina Convention that ratified
the Constitution. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 600 (1881).
251. 3 U.S. at 174, 3 Dall. at 175 (Chase, J.). Justice Iredell stated: "[P]erhaps, a direct
tax... can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil." Id. at 182,
3 Dall. at 183 (Iredell, J.). Justice Paterson agreed. See id. at 177 (Paterson, J.).
252. Id. at 175, 3 Dali. at 176 (Paterson, J.). Paterson intended this comment to provide a
guide to interpreting the meaning of "direct," "excise," and "duty" since "the natural and
common, or technical and appropriate, meaning of the words.., is not easy to ascertain." Id.
253. Id. at 178, 3 Dall. at 176.
254. Id. at 175, 3 Dall. at 176.
255. Id. at 175 (Chase, J.) (emphasis in original).
256. 157 U.S. 429, reh'g granted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
257. "The taxing power is given in the most comprehensive terms." Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1869) (tax on income of insurance companies was indirect).
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 547, 549 (1869), held that a tax on state bank
notes was both constitutional and indirect. The Court said that in light of the weakness of the
Articles of Confederation, the framers of the Constitution intended to give to Congress the
power to tax in "its fullest extent." Id. at 540. The Court continued:
The comprehensiveness of the power, thus given to Congress, may serve to ex-
plain, at least, the absence of any attempt by members of the Convention to
define, even in debate, the terms of the grant. The words used certainly describe
the whole power, and it was the intention of the Convention that the whole
power should be conferred. The definition of particular words, therefore, be-
came unimportant.
Id. at 541. Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346 (1875), held that the succession tax
was an excise or duty tax. Finally, Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881), held
that an income tax was an excise or duty tax and that only capitulation taxes and taxes on real
estate were direct taxes. The issue, of whether a tax is direct, it stated, was not an economic
issue but "one exclusively in American jurisprudence." Id. The meaning of a "direct tax" was
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In accordance with this expansionist view of congressional power, the
Court's powers of judicial review were downplayed. In Hylton Justice Chase
had expressed uncertainty whether the Court could invalidate a congres-
sional act. 258 In Marbury v. Madison the Court clearly announced its pow-
ers of judicial review. 25 9 Nevertheless, the Court did not exercise this power
in a tax case until 1895.260 Instead, the Court practically ignored its power
in the tax area. In 1868 in Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule the Court stated:
Where the power of taxation, exercised by Congress, is warranted by
the Constitution, as to mode and subject, it is, necessarily, unlimited in
its nature. . . . Within the limits of the constitution [Congress] is
supreme in its action. No power of supervision or control is lodged in
either of the other departments of the government. 26'
Although the Constitution limited the taxing power and the Court re-
viewed statutes for constitutional violations, in actuality the Court never
found such a violation. The Court construed the contract and due process
provisions of the Constitution to have little or no limiting effect on the taxing
power. 26 2 The explicit constitutional limitations on the taxing power con-
tained in the rules of uniformity and apportionment were interpreted so ex-
pansively that they provided no real limitations. Underlying these decisions
was the Court's understanding that a broad congressional power to tax was
fundamental to the nation's survival. All the taxes involved could not be
apportioned practically; therefore, if the taxes were direct, Congress's real
and necessary power to tax would be emasculated. 263
In 1895, in the original decision and the rehearing of Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. the Supreme Court dramatically reversed its interpretation
of the taxing power and thereby challenged the accepted roles of Court and
Congress in the tax field.264 In the first Pollock case the Court invalidated
much discussed in connection with the ratification of the sixteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Morrow, The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1910) (discussing origins of
term "direct" and the term's implications in interpreting the sixteenth amendment); Whitney,
The Income Tax and the Constitution, 20 HARV. L. REV. 280 (1907) (discussing meaning and
origins of term "direct" and the advisability of a constitutional amendment). E. SELIGMAN,
supra note 14, at 535-55 also discusses the meaning of "direct" taxes in depth.
258. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
259. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
260. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
261. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 443 (1869). In Veazie Bank v. Fenno the taxpayer had argued
that the tax on state bank notes was so excessive that it indicated a congressional intent to
destroy the bank's franchise. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869). Thus, Congress had exceeded
its constitutional powers. Id. The Court responded:
[T]he judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative departments of the government
limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may
be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is
not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected.
Id. at 548.
262. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, for example, the bank had contended that the tax impaired
the franchise granted by the state. The Court, however, did not invoke either the contract or
the due process clause to invalidate the tax. See 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 547 (1869). In Stock-
dale v. Insurance Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323, 332-33 (1874), the Court reaffirmed that a
retroactive tax was constitutional.
263. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
264. 157 U.S. 429, 582-86, reh'ggranted, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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only two portions of the Income Tax Act of 1894: (1) the tax on income
from municipal securities; 265 and (2) the tax on rents and income from real
property.266 The validity of the latter tax hinged on whether the tax was a
direct tax.267 Previous Supreme Court decisions had made this determina-
tion on practical grounds. The Pollock Court, though it couched its decision
in practical language, used an economic approach and defined a direct tax as
one whose burden could not be shifted to another taxpayer. 268 Using this
definition, the Court found that the tax on rents was a tax on the real estate
itself and thus constituted a direct tax that had to be apportioned. 269
The original Pollock Court was evenly divided on the other issues:
(1) whether the tax on rents from personalty was a direct tax; and
(2) whether the invalidity of the tax on land rents invalidated the entire
act.270 On rehearing, one Justice changed his mind.27 1 The Court then held
by a one-vote majority that the tax was a direct tax on personalty and that
the entire Act was unconstitutional. 272
The Pollock decision abandoned the Court's prior expansionist view of the
taxing power and contradicted apparently clear precedent holding that an
income tax was not a direct tax. 273 The decision was consistent, however,
with a general trend then present in the Court actively to protect private
265. 157 U.S. at 586.
266. Id. at 583.
267. Id. at 580-81.
268. Id. at 558. The Court said this definition was "prima facie correct," and went on to
prove that the historical context of adoption of the term supported the definition. Id. See
Morrow, supra note 257, at 407, which states: "On the great question of what is a 'direct tax'
the result of the [Pollock] decision was to turn over the uncommonly practical question of
taxation to the economists." But see Justice White's dissent upon rehearing in which he states
that the Pollock Court both rejected the old practical test and failed to follow an economic
definition. 158 U.S. at 710-11. Despite its economic rationale, however, upon rehearing the
Pollock case used the language of practicality. Chief Justice Fuller stated both that the Consti-
tution is to be construed in its "obvious sense," and that such construction was required
"[w]hatever the speculative views of economists or revenue reformers may be." Id. at 627.
269. 157 U.S. at 580-83.
270. Id. at 586.
271. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 579. Judge Shivas was believed at the time to be the
judge who changed his mind, but the true identity of the swing vote is not known. Farrelly,
Justice Harlan's Dissent in the Pollock Case, 24 S. CAL. L. REV. 175 (1951).
272. 158 U.S. at 637.
273. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 593, 602 (1880), upheld an income tax, based
on the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 116, 13 Stat. 223, 281, as amended by the Act of March
3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 479, that was imposed upon income received from professional
services and U.S. bonds.
An income tax had been proposed in 1815 to help pay for the expenses of the War of 1812.
The war ended, however, before the tax was enacted. Drafting the bill at a time when many of
the framers of the Constitution were still alive, the House Committee on Ways and Means had
assumed the tax was not a direct tax. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 430. Congress also
treated the income tax as an indirect tax in its discussion during the Civil War. Id. at 434-35.
By 1895 and the Pollock case, it appeared well-established that the income tax was an indirect
tax. Id.
In 1909 The Nation described the situation at the time of Pollock as an "hilarious incredibil-
ity... displayed in 1894, over the proposal to challenge the income tax in the Supreme Court.
Why, it was res adjudicata; the Court itself had upheld the validity of the tax, and how ridicu-
lous it was to imagine that it could be upset. But it was upset." Editorial, 89 NATION 20, 173
(1909) (the main topic of the editorial was the court challenge to the 1909 Excise Act).
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property rights. Pollock, in fact, represents merely one of three cases de-
cided in 1895 that epitomized for the public the Court's extreme pro-busi-
ness bias. The three cases, Pollock, United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,274 and
In re Debs,275 created much public furor concerning both the pro-business
bias of the decisions and the role of the Court in usurping congressional
power.
2 7 6
Knight, the "Sugar Trust Case," held that corporations involved in the
refinement of sugar had not committed federal antitrust violations because
manufacturing was not interstate commerce.277 In re Debs, decided a week
after Pollock, upheld an injunction against obstructing railroads engaged in
interstate commerce. 278 All three cases were laissez-faire, pro-business deci-
sions. Pollock and Knight, through narrow interpretations of constitutional
provisions, left the propertied class alone so that it could pursue business
and the accumulation of private wealth without governmental restriction.
Debs allowed the executive branch to use its powers to protect private
property.
Paradoxically, a pro-business, laissez-faire judicial policy required an ac-
tivist Court. To protect business from both union activists and legislative
regulation the Court expanded its powers in two ways. First, as in In re
Debs, the Court increasingly exercised its equity jurisdiction and the use of
injunctions to protect business. Second, as in Pollock, it exercised its power
274. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
275. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
276. 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 421-26 (1922);
see also Edwards, The Federal Judiciary and Its Attitude Towards the People, 5 MICH. L.J. 183,
192-93 (1896) (reporting some press comments on the pro-business bias of the decisions). For
contemporary views of the judicial usurpation issue, see, e.g., Aggressions of the Federal Courts,
32 AM. L. REV. 669 (1898); Edwards, supra, at 183-84; Winchester, The Judiciary---Its Grow-
ing Power and Influence, 32 AM. L. REV. 801 (1898). The Justices who dissented in Pollock
also raised this issue, as well as the issue of the extreme pro-business bias of the Pollock deci-
sion. E.g., 158 U.S. at 695 (Justice Brown stated that "the decision involves nothing less than
the surrender of the taxing power to the moneyed class"); Id. at 672, 674, 679, 685 (statements
of Justice Harlan); Id. at 712 (statements of Justice White); see also infra note 281 (discussing
contemporary popular response).
E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 586-87, contains many references to contemporary articles
on Pollock, most of which were critical. For a supportive view of Pollock, see Sewell, The
Income Tax: Is It Constitutional, 28 AM. L. REV. 808, 808 (1894). Writing before the deci-
sion, Sewell asserted that the Tax Act of 1894 should be invalidated because it was "of purely
socialistic tendency." Id.
For a good overview of the laissez-faire era in which the Court protected individual property
rights against congressional efforts at social legislation and redistribution of economic wealth,
see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 7, 8 (1978). The Court's best tool in its
efforts to protect individual economic rights was substantive due process under the fourteenth
amendment as epitomized in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the case which gave
its name to an era. See id. at 53; see also A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF
LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960) (exploring the judiciary's enforce-
ment of laissez-faire conservatism). For a more contemporary view of the entire Lochner era,
see D. ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 104-20, 214 (1937) (reis-
sued by Kennikat Press in 1967).
277. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17.
278. Debs, 158 U.S. at 599. The Debs case arose out of the Pullman strike. See, e.g., A.
PAUL, supra note 276, at 131-58 (discussing the Debs case and its contribution to the legal
conservatism of the era).
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of judicial review and thereby limited congressional power. Many commen-
tators saw both types of activity as usurpations of power. 279
For many people Pollock epitomized the laissez-faire Court's blatant pro-
business stance and its usurpation of power through judicial review. The
plaintiff in Pollock had directly raised the class issue by referring to the spec-
ter of socialism lurking behind the income tax.280 The dissenting judges as
well as the public recognized that the decision favored the propertied
class.2 81 Furthermore, the case raised the issue of judicial review and the
balance of power in a particularly dramatic way. Marbury v. Madison, as
the first Pollock decision noted, had established the Supreme Court's right of
judicial review. 28 2 Nevertheless, the Court had never invalidated a statute in
the tax area before the Pollock case. 28 3 The Pollock decision thereby auto-
matically provided an opportunity to object for those who still protested the
right of judicial review.
Two other facts unique to the Pollock case caused others to join the furor.
First, the very nature of the taxing power highlighted the gravity of the judi-
cial review issue. The power to tax is fundamental to a government. By
restricting that power the Pollock Court potentially crippled the federal gov-
ernment or endangered its survival.28 4 Thus, even those who generally fa-
279. For a listing of contemporary articles on the subject, see 3 C. WARREN, supra note
276, at 424-27. See also, e.g., authorities cited supra note 276; Edwards, supra note 276, at 194
(Court has assumed power that Congress ought to have and has displayed this authority in the
income tax area in "a more pronounced attitude.., than ever before"); Patteson, The Judicial
Usurpation of Power, 10 VA. L. REG. 855, 855 (1905) ("[T]he greatest danger which threatens
the American republic is the judicial usurpation of power .... The fatal extension of the power
of the process of injunction ... [was] the greatest step of all.").
280. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 532 (appellant's argument before the Court).
281. See supra note 276; see also Riddle, supra note 247. Riddle characterized the Pollock
case as "a unique product of judicial solicitude for the salvation of society against itself, the
bugaboo of socialism set forth by the attorneys for the complainant caused the court to declare
a tax on income from property, real or personal, to be a direct tax." Id. at 577. Justice
Harlan, in a letter to his sons shortly after the Pollock case, expressed his opinion that the case
will become as hateful with the American people as the Dred Scott case was
when it was decided. That was the attempt of the owners of slave property to
dominate the freemen of America and compel them against their wishes to sus-
tain the institution of slavery. The recent decision will have the effect ...to
make the freemen of America the slaves of accumulated wealth.
Farrelly, supra note 271, at 180 (quoting Justice Harlan's letter of May 24, 1895). Arnold Paul
provides a good discussion of Pollock in connection with the Debs and E. C Knight cases. A.
PAUL, supra note 276, at 159-220 (including many citations to contemporary sources). E.
SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 576-89, is useful, as always.
Not everyone was critical of the Pollock decision. Writing prior to the decision, Robert
Sewell stated that the 1894 Act should be invalidated because it had been passed by Democrats
who wished to "curry favor of the Populists and throw a sop to the Socialists. It is a measure
of purely socialistic tendency." Sewell, supra note 276, at 808.
282. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 554 (citing 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
283. See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., 158 U.S. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan said that the decision
"strikes at the very foundations of national authority, in that it denies to the general govern-
ment a power which is, or may become, vital to the very existence and preservation of the
Union .... It tends to reestablish that condition of helplessness [under the Articles of Confed-
eration] ...." Id.; see also id. at 695 (Brown, J., dissenting) (decision may imperil country);
Id. at 705 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (decision endangers Congress's ability to tax); W.
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 216, at 36.
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vored judicial review might limit its exercise in the tax area. Second, the fact
that the Court-by the change of one Justice's vote-had not only invali-
dated a federal statute but also overruled its own apparent precedent created
concern about the legitimacy of the Court's power of judicial review and the
integrity of its decision-making process. 285
The Court soon retreated from its extremely active pro-business position.
The Court checked its aggressive stance vis-A-vis Congress, and from Pollock
until the adoption of the sixteenth amendment the Court upheld every tax
statute that came before it. The Court accomplished this retreat primarily
by abandoning an economic definition of direct tax and returning to the pre-
Pollock practical definition: if the tax could not be apportioned practically,
it was not a direct tax.286 The Court thus moderated its fervid protection of
the propertied class and upheld a variety of taxes, including a progressive
inheritance tax287 and a corporate excise tax based on net income.288
285. Justice Harlan stated in his dissent that, in light of the contrary precedent, the Pollock
decision holding that the income tax must be apportioned "may, not improperly, be regarded
as a judicial revolution, that may sow the seeds of hate and distrust among the people of
different sections of our common country." 158 U.S. at 665. Sylvester Pennoyer, former Gov-
ernor of Oregon, stated that the Court had no power to invalidate a congressional law and that
Congress should "impeach the nullifying judges for the usurpation of legislative power." Pen-
noyer, The Income Tax Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court to Nullify Acts of Con-
gress, 29 AM. L. REV. 550, 558 (1895). Another commentator, however, characterized
Pennoyer's article as "a course of childishly vicious reasoning." Allen, The Income Tax Deci-
sion: An Answer to Gov. Pennoyer, 29 AM. L. REV. 847, 853 (1895). See supra notes 279-81
and accompanying text (discussing other contemporary views).
286. For example, in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83 (1900), a succession tax was held
not to be a direct tax. The Knowlton Court (quoting Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515-16
(1899)) stated:
In deciding upon the validity of a tax with reference to these requirements, no
microscopic examination as to the purely economic or theoretical nature of the
tax should be indulged in for the purpose of placing it in a category which would
invalidate the tax. As a mere abstract, scientific or economical problem, a par-
ticular tax might possibly be regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter
pertaining to the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be
indirect. Under such circumstances, and while varying and disputable theories
might be indulged as to the real nature of the tax, a court would not be justified,
for the purpose of invalidating the tax, in placing it in a class different from that
to which its practical results would consign it. Taxation is eminently practical,
and is, in fact, brought to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding
upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, rather
than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness is
the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who are experts in the
science of political economy.
178 U.S. at 83. Pollock had turned over the "uncommonly practical question" of what is a
direct tax to economists. Morrow, supra note 257, at 407. To the extent Pollock was based on
economic definitions, Knowlton was seen as overruling Pollock. E.g., Whitney, supra note 257,
at 186.
287. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900). The Court did restrict Congress, how-
ever, by interpreting the statute so as to apply progressive rates only to each inherited share,
not to the inheritance as a whole. Id. at 77.
288. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 177 (1911). In Stone Tracy the Court was not
obliged to rule directly on an income tax since the act was technically an excise tax. By up-
holding the tax as a tax on doing business the Court escaped a difficult situation. The Court
avoided overruling its own precedent in Pollock without offending Congress. Overruling the
Excise Act would have been a slap in Congress's face since Congress had gone to great techni-
cal lengths to avoid the constitutional problems of Pollock. See, e.g., 92 NATION 258 (1911).
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Through these decisions the Court allowed Congress to chip away at the
fringes of accumulated wealth.
The Court's retreat from the attitudes evidenced in Pollock was a practical
and tactical necessity in light of the furor that the case had caused. The shift
was merely a retreat, however, and not a capitulation. Pollock was not over-
ruled. The constitutional ban on income tax protected the wealthy. The
income tax, more than any excise or sales tax, can focus on individual wealth
and both limit its accumulation and partially redistribute it. The corporate
excise tax, although based on income, was not as direct an attack on individ-
ual wealth since it was levied on corporations. The succession tax also lim-
ited wealth accumulation by taxing transfers from one generation to another,
but the Court's approval of that tax may have been partly based on the fact
that the tax was passed to support the war effort during the Spanish-Ameri-
can War.289 Traditionally, the Court tended to view Congress's taxing
power more broadly during times of war.290 Thus, from 1895 until 1913 the
Court moderated its protection of property in the tax area. The Court, how-
ever, did not change its position on the income tax, which because of its
flexibility and focus on the individual possessed the most potential to dam-
age the propertied class's accumulation of wealth.
Similarly, in terms of the relationship between Court and Congress, dur-
ing the period between Pollock and the sixteenth amendment, the Court had
avoided a confrontation, but had not yielded. To yield would have meant
overruling Pollock. Such a move might have weakened the Court's authority
relative to the other branches of government and caused the public to lose
confidence in the Court as an institution. 291
By 1909 the factors outlined above indicated that the Court probably
would not overrule Pollock. Pressure to enact an income tax, however, was
growing. Income tax legislation would place Congress and the Court in di-
rect conflict. To forestall passage of the tax, President Taft proposed a com-
promise: Congress would pass only a corporate excise tax based on net
income, and a constitutional amendment would then be proposed to deal
On the other hand, if the Court overruled Pollock, Congress might think that its attempts to
avoid a direct confrontation with the Court were not appreciated. See Bickel, The Judiciary
and Responsible Government 1910-21, Part One, in 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 242-43 (1984). Professor Bickel viewed the Stone Tracy decision merely
as a procedural finesse out of the difficult situation of not overruling its own decision in Pollock
and yet properly rewarding Congress for its deference to the Court demonstrated by Con-
gress's decision not to pass a pure income tax. Substantively, he appeared to see no difference
between overruling Pollock, which in his view the sixteenth amendment soon made obsolete,
and holding that the tax was an excise tax. In this respect, Professor Bickel is in accord with
many contemporary writers who saw no difference between the corporate tax upheld in Stone
Tracy and the income tax act held unconstitutional in Pollock. Id. at 247 (citing contemporary
writers on both sides of the question of whether a difference existed). A subtle but important
difference, however, does exist. By leaving the Pollock case intact, the Court left itself free to
interpret the sixteenth amendment narrowly. See infra notes 293-326 and accompanying text.
289. War Revenue Act, ch. 448, §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464-66 (1898).
290. E.g., The Civil War Revenue Acts had been upheld in Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586 (1880).




with the income tax. In July of 1909 Congress passed a joint resolution
proposing the sixteenth amendment. 292
Congress scarcely debated the joint resolution despite the fact that the
exact meaning of the amendment was unclear.293 Contemporary discussion
focused on two major issues: (1) whether the income tax was still a direct
tax and, therefore, not subject to the rule of uniformity;294 and (2) whether
the amendment added new powers or simply overruled Pollock by eliminat-
ing the need to apportion a direct tax. 295 The core issue of defining income
was simply ignored.
The ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913 did not stop the
Court's activist role in the income tax area. The vagueness of the amend-
ment left a void for the Court to fill. From the first case interpreting a stat-
ute passed under the amendment until the capital gains cases in 1921 the
Court narrowly interpreted the amendment. In the process, the Court twice
invalidated statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the amendment.
296
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, decided in 1916, upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Revenue Act of 1913, the first statute passed under the six-
teenth amendment. 297  In holding the statute constitutional, the Court
reaffirmed Congress's broad power to tax with minimal constitutional limita-
tions. Thus, for example, the Court held that the retroactivity of the statute
was not unconstitutional. 298 More importantly, the Court held that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment did not constrain the taxing power
unless the tax was so arbitrary as to be confiscatory.299 The Court stated
292. Taft sent his message to Congress on June 16, 1909. By July Congress had passed
Joint Resolution 40 proposing the amendment. For histories of the introduction of the amend-
ment and the excise tax, see, e.g., E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 591-96; Sherman, The Recent
Constitutional Amendments, 23 YALE L.J. 129 (1913). The amendment was finally ratified in
1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
293. The lack of congressional debate was noted contemporaneously by E. SELIGMAN,
supra note 14, at 593-96, as well as by later commentators, such as A. MASON & W. BEANEY,
THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 136 (1959).
294. For discussions of the issue of a direct tax, see, e.g., Morrow, supra note 257; Sher-
man, supra note 227; Whitney, supra note 257. Whitney, for example, agreed with those who
had supported an abolition of the apportionment rule rather than making an exception to it for
income taxes. Id. at 296. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916), held that the
rule of uniformity contained in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 applied to the income tax. Id. at
12-13. Moreover, the Court stated that the graduated rate structure of the tax did not violate
the uniformity clause: "it is settled that that clause exacts only a geographical uniformity."
Id. at 24. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 621-26, had predicted this result. Uniformity,
according to Seligman, permitted different treatment of different classes of property, but re-
quired equal treatment within a class. Id. at 622-25.
295. The debate on whether the amendment gave Congress new powers focused in particu-
lar on whether Congress could tax income from state and local securities. Justice Hughes had
raised this argument when he was Governor of New York in his objection to ratification of the
amendment. See, e.g., E. SELIGMAN, supra note 14, at 596; Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amend-
ment, 33 HARV. L. REV. 794, 798 (1920) (sixteenth amendment gives power to tax income
from state and local salaries and bonds); Morrow, supra note 257, at 407.
296. See infra notes 305-14.
297. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
298. Id. at 20 (citing Stockdale v. Insurance Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323, 331 (1873), as
authority for position on retroactivity).
299. 240 U.S. at 24-25.
[Vol. 39
CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION
that the plaintiff's contention that the progressive tax was sufficiently arbi-
trary disregarded the fact "that its absolute want of foundation in reason was
plainly pointed out in Knowlton v. Moore, . . . and the right to urge it was
necessarily foreclosed by the ruling in that case made. '' 3°°
A progressive income tax redistributes wealth and thus represents the type
of social and economic legislation that a pro-business, laissez-faire court
would want to invalidate. Whatever the Court may have desired, however,
it had little choice. To invalidate the progressive feature of the Act would
have been a direct assault on congressional powers. It would recreate the
furor of Pollock without producing much benefit. Because even a non-
progressive income tax redistributes wealth, the primary infringement of pri-
vate economic rights was protected by the sixteenth amendment. Given the
history of Pollock and the relatively small positive result that could be ob-
tained from invalidating the progressive structure, the Court undoubtedly
felt compelled to uphold that portion of the Act.30 1
Although the Brushaber Court generally interpreted congressional taxing
powers broadly, it viewed the scope of the sixteenth amendment narrowly.
As previously discussed, one of the major contemporary concerns about the
amendment was whether it removed all constitutional limitations from the
income tax. Direct taxes were subject to the rule of apportionment, but not
to the rule of uniformity. Since the sixteenth amendment relieved the in-
come tax from apportionment, people were concerned that the income tax,
as a direct tax, would be free from all constitutional restraints and thus
would upset the delicate balance between state and national powers. 30 2 The
Brushaber Court restricted the scope of the amendment and abated the dan-
ger. The rule of uniformity applied, it said, because income taxes were basi-
cally excise taxes; according to the Court, Pollock had not held that the
300. Id. at 25 (citation omitted); accord Tyee Realty Co. v. Anderson, 240 U.S. 115, 117-18
(1916).
301. The Brushaber Court's approval of the progressivity feature is similar to the approach
it later took in Merchants' Loan with respect to capital gains. The similarity lies in the Court's
disdainful dismissal of arguments as being without "foundation in reason," Brushaber, 240
U.S. at 25, or "ingenious," Merchants' Loan, 255 U.S. at 221. Both opinions rely on question-
able precedent. Indeed, the use of such summary language seems to occur whenever the Court
relies on questionable authority. The dubiousness of the authority that the Court relied on in
Merchants'Loan is discussed supra in notes 144-211 and accompanying text. As to the ques-
tionable authority relied on in Brushaber, see, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law: Income
Tax: Sixteenth Amendment, 4 CAL. L. REV. 333, 336 (1916); Note, supra note 122, at 445.
These articles state that Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900), and Magoun v. Illinois Trust
& Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898), on which Knowlton relied, were limited to progressive taxes
on the right to inherit and did not apply to taxes on property. In fact, the government con-
ceded in its brief in Magoun that if the tax in that case was a property tax it would have been
invalid. Hackett, supra note 122, at 433 n.4.
The progressive feature of the 1913 Act was one of the most discussed features. See, e.g.,
various editorials in 96 NATION 117, 224, 432, 490 (1913).
302. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 257, at 411-12; Riddle, supra note 247, at 574; Note, The
Bearing of the Sixteenth Amendment on the Power of Congress to Tax Any Income Regardless
of Its Source, 7 VA. L. REV. 136 (1920). The last article stated that the amendment "was so
sweeping in its terms and all-inclusive in the construction that might possibly be given it, that
its ratification gave rise to grave apprehension-the fear that it would undermine some of the
vital safeguards placed about our system of government." Id. at 137.
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income tax was a direct tax.30 3
The Court's restrictive view of the amendment appeared in another series
of cases holding that the amendment conferred no new powers of taxation.
The Court first made this statement in dictum in 1916.304 In 1920, however,
the Court decided two cases that directly and dramatically limited the scope
of the amendment. The first case, Eisner v. Macomber,305 raised the question
of whether a stock dividend was income within the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment. In concluding that it was not income, the Court reasserted
both its narrow view of the amendment and its activist role in the income tax
field. The provision of the Revenue Act of 1916 under which Macomber
arose was similar to the 1913 provision invalidated by the Court in Towne v.
Eisner.30 6 The Macomber majority held that Towne controlled because
"Congress intended in that act [of 1913] to exert its power to the extent
permitted by the Amendment. '' 30 7 Although the 1913 Act exerted congres-
sional taxing powers to their constitutional limits, the attempt to tax stock
dividends exceeded those limits. Since stock dividends were not income
under the 1913 Act they could not be income under the 1916 Act. 30 8 Only
income was taxable, and stock dividends were not income. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court restated its position, first announced in Brushaber and
Baltic Mining, that the sixteenth amendment created no new powers to tax.
The amendment simply eliminated any necessity to apportion an income
tax.30 9 Moreover, the Court specifically rejected a broad interpretation of
income.310
303. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 16-17, 19. Many early commentators expounded on this re-
strictive view of the Court. See, e.g., A. MASON & W. BEANEY, supra note 293, at 136-37; S.
RATNER, supra note 14, at 337-38; Brown, The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 54 AM. L. REV. 843, 845 (1920); Riddle, supra note 247, at 576. The Court's
statement that Pollock did not hold that the income tax was a direct tax involved a high degree
of verbal legerdemain since Pollock had held the tax unconstitutional because it was a direct
tax. 157 U.S. at 580-83.
For a more recent examination of the rule of uniformity and the income tax, see Amidon v.
Kane, 444 Pa. 38, 279 A.2d 53, 58-60 (1971). The consolidated cases decided in Amidon all
involved the Pennsylvania income tax, which was a flat percentage of taxable income as de-
fined under federal tax laws. The court held that the tax base had so many inequalities due to
deductions and exclusions that it violated the Pennsylvania Constitution's requirement of uni-
formity. 279 A.2d at 60-63.
304. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112 (1916) (tax on mining company's
gross income held constitutional); see also William E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172-
73 (1918) (tax on net income of corporation which exports goods is valid). In Peck the Court's
statement also was not necessary to the decision. Id. at 172-73.
305. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
306. 245 U.S. 418 (1918). But cf. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1918) (ex-
traordinary cash dividend was income although based on earning accrued prior to the adop-
tion of the sixteenth amendment); Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1918) (dividend
payable in stock of another corporation was income despite being based on pre-1916 earnings).
307. 252 U.S. at 203.
308. Id. at 207; see supra note 70.
309. 252 U.S. at 206.
310. Id. at 214-17. The Court cited Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 116 N.E. 904 (1917).
See supra note 71 for a discussion of how the Macomber Court handled the Trefry case. The
Macomber Court stated that it could not accept the reasoning of Trefry because the interpreta-
tion of the sixteenth amendment was constrained by "other constitutional provisions that
stand in the way of extending it by construction." 252 U.S. at 217.
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Three months later in Evans v. Gore the Court reiterated that the sixteenth
amendment conferred no new powers. 31' The issue in Gore was whether a
tax on federal judges' income violated article I, section 1, clause 6 of the
Constitution, which prohibited any diminution in the salary of judges. 312
Although recognizing that congressional ppwer to tax was broad, the Court
emphasized it was not unlimited. 313 Certain exceptions to the power existed.
Congress, for example, had no right to tax state and municipal securities or,
as here, federal judges' salaries. 3 14
The practical effect of the narrow interpretation of the sixteenth amend-
ment contained in both Macomber and Gore was to expand the role of the
Court in the income tax area. The Court would be constantly asked to de-
cide whether a particular provision was within the narrow scope of the tax-
ing power. The Court would be the arbiter of whether a particular item was
income. Such constant intervention would upset the delicate balance of
power between the Court and Congress. The dissent in both cases, therefore,
favored a broad interpretation of the taxing power. 31 5 A natural concomi-
tant of a broad interpretation would have been a withdrawal from the tax
field. The Court, as Justice Brandeis stated in his Macomber dissent, should
invalidate an act of Congress only in a "clear case."' 316 If the Court broadly
construed the sixteenth amendment, fewer clear cases would require Court
intervention.
Although the Gore case went generally unnoticed, Congress and the pub-
lic perceived the Macomber case as severely disturbing the balance of
power. 3 17 For example, Professor Thomas Reed Powell acknowledged that
311. 253 U.S. 245, 261 (1920).
312. Congress had passed this portion of the income tax without being sure as to whether it
was constitutional. See 253 U.S. at 248 (citing 56 CONG. REC. 10,370 (1918)).
313. 253 U.S. at 255.
314. Id.
315. In Evans v. Gore Justice Holmes in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brandeis
stated his conclusion that the original Constitution permitted the taxation of judges' salaries.
Even if the original Constitution did not, the sixteenth amendment permitted such taxation
because it allowed an income tax to be imposed on income from whatever source. 253 U.S. at
267. Justice Holmes, who had written the opinion in Towne v. Eisner that invalidated an
income tax on stock dividends, also dissented in Macomber. He believed that the Towne deci-
sion "was right in its reasoning and result." Macomber, 252 U.S. at 219. Nevertheless, in his
view the Towne decision had been based on statutory language rather than constitutional prin-
ciples. In a constitutional sense, Holmes believed that the sixteenth amendment permitted
such taxation since the "known purpose" of the amendment was "to get rid of nice questions
as to what might be direct taxes." Id. at 220.
316. 252 U.S. at 238. Justice Clarke, author of the Merchants' Loan decision, joined in
Justice Brandeis's opinion. In a footnote, Justice Brandeis quoted the Sinking Fund Cases:
"One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger.
The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary
rule." Id. n.1 (quoting Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).
317. Charles Clark believed that "two possible reasons" existed for the lack of public inter-
est in Gore. First, the case involved an ostensibly narrow issue; "the larger question [the
constitutionality of a tax on the incomes of federal judges] was only perceived upon a study of
the opinion." Second, many felt that the question of such nontaxability of state securities was
"well settled." Comment, supra note 230, at 76. Harry Hubbard, one of the few observers to
comment on the case, thought that the sixteenth amendment amended the entire Constitution.
The amendment, therefore, overrode any prior constitutional limitations on the taxation of
federal judges' salaries. Hubbard, From Whatever Source Derived, 6 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1920, at
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the majority in Macomber was correct from an economic standpoint. Never-
theless, he stated that the true issue in Macomber was "the Supreme Court's
conception of its function": 318 what was the Court's role in interpreting the
sixteenth amendment and the income tax statutes? On this issue Powell dis-
agreed with the majority; in his Qpinion, the Court should overrule Congress
only when it had a "clear mandate" to do so. 319 The Macomber majority, he
wrote, interpreted the sixteenth amendment literally. It did not abolish Pol-
lock, but merely eliminated the need to determine whether the tax was di-
rect. This holding contradicted the purpose of the amendment, which was
"passed to unshackle Congress from the chains riveted" by Pollock.320
Others reacted more emotionally to the Macomber decision. One commen-
tator characterized the decision as "riding-rough shod" over Congress and
stated that the Court should defer to Congress because to declare an act of
Congress unconstitutional "strike[s] a blow at the foundation of our institu-
tions. ' 321 The decision caused an outpouring of protest in Congress, which
202, 206; see also Hubbard, supra note 295 (sixteenth amendment gives new power to tax
income from government salaries and bonds). In 1925 the Court again dealt with the issue.
The Court held that a tax on the salary of a Court of Claims judge was invalid as it was within
the "plain rule" of Evans v. Gore. Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501, 509 (1925). In 1939 the
Court finally reversed itself. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 283 (1939) (the Court
specifically overruled Graham, but not Gore).
Although contemporary commentators recognized that the true issue in Macomber was a
struggle between the Court and Congress, modern commentators generally do not focus on
this issue. To the best of this author's knowledge only Bickel, supra note 288, at 506-13,
explores this aspect of Macomber in any depth. Even Professor Bickel's analysis, however, is
too limited. Macomber was not the only income tax case of its era involved in the Court-
Congress struggle. Bickel fails to relate Macomber properly to these cases and thus does not
completely explain the issue. Macomber, for example, is not adequately identified with cases
such as Brushaber. Macomber merely continued the narrow activist role of the Court that
Brushaber began. See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text. More importantly, Bickel
entirely fails to connect Macomber with the capital gains cases of 1921. As this Article shows,
the results in these cases were in part a response to the furor that Macomber created. See infra
notes 326-33 and accompanying text. As such, the capital gains cases represent a turning point
in the Court's conception of its function in the tax area. See also S. RATNER, supra note 14, at
336-37.
318. Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 536, 549 (1920).
319. Id. at 538.
320. Id. at 549.
321. Note, supra note 52, at 539. Another interesting contemporary opinion was expressed
as an editorial in the New Republic. The anonymous writer stated that the "deeper implica-
tions" of the Macomber decision "have hardly caused a ripple, and yet they challenge the
wisdom of leaving the ultimate law-making power of the nation to nine men. At least they call
for a consideration of the safeguards to be imposed upon the extraordinary judicial power of
the Supreme Court." The Supreme Court vs. The Supreme Court, 22 NEw REPUBLIC 235, 235
(1920) (Bickel, supra note 288, at 511, asserts that this editorial was written by Felix Frank-
furter).
The editorial occasioned some correspondence. Professor Edward Corwin responded:
[T]he practical nub of your article is difficult to discover. Is it merely that the
Court should not be regarded as "a sacred priesthood free from criticism?"
Of course it shouldn't. But perhaps it would be fair to exact of the critic
something approaching the same measurement of intelligence and good faith
that he demands of the Court. The fact is, that the Court has always been
subject to criticism, and the further fact is that no part of the national govern-




did not abate for years and which included proposals for constitutional
amendments to permit the taxation of stock dividends and state and local
income. 322
Both decisions raised practical concerns as well as constitutional ones. A
narrow construction of the sixteenth amendment, such as in Macomber and
Gore, meant that numerous questions would be raised about the constitu-
tionality of particular statutory provisions. Such uncertainty in a tax system
was highly undesirable, especially in a system that relied on self-assess-
ment. 323 To expect the Court to decide every minor issue was impractica-
ble,324 yet the desire and need for constitutional certainty would demand
that the Court make minor decisions. The Macomber Court had attempted
to provide certainty by defining income. The Court's narrow interpretation
of income resulted in a "regrettable tying of the hands of the legislator and
an undue curtailment of legislative discretion, with the result of raising many
new problems in the place of the single problem which the courts endeavor
to settle."'325
The concern over the balance of power was still high when the 1921 capi-
23 NEW REPUBLIC 60, 60 (1920).
The editor rebutted:
The question before the Court [in Macomber] was not whether a stock dividend
is "income." That is a question as to which opinion is bound to differ .... But
that, we insist, was not the question before the Supreme Court.... The question
before the Supreme Court was the very much narrower issue whether Congress
in declaring that a stock dividend is "income," within the purport of the eight-
eenth [sic] amendment, went outside its constitutional boundaries. Such an is-
sue is not to be decided by technical niceties.
Id. at 61. The editor further stated that criticism of the Court is proper when, as in Macomber,
the Court took too narrow a view of the Constitution. Such petty views, he said, posed a
serious danger, and "the work of the Court, as at present constituted, does not make the
danger seem any less serious." Id. The editor's solution was to have as judges "able men, men
of the caliber of Marshall and Moody, Hughes and Holmes." Id. (Perhaps a Frankfurter as
well.)
322. Senator Knute Nelsen of Minnesota immediately proposed an amendment to override
Macomber. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1920, at 20, col. 6; Editorial, A Grotesque Amendment, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 29, 1920, at 20, col. 2. As is evidenced by the many New York Times editorials
cited in this Article, The Times would be expected to characterize the proposed amendment as
grotesque since the paper was adamantly against the taxation of anything that appeared to be
capital. As to the issue of taxing federal judicial salaries raised in Evans v. Gore, Charles Clark
stated that the chances that an amendment overriding Gore would be passed were "slight" due
to state opposition. Comment, supra note 230, at 80.
In the congressional debates concerning the 1921 Revenue Act, Senator Watson of Georgia
stated that Congress ought to annul the Macomber decision and tax stock dividends. Senator
McCumber had remarked that the 1916 Tax Act had "annulled" the Supreme Court decision
in Towne v. Eisner (stock dividends not taxable under the 1913 Act), but that the Supreme
Court had annulled that act in Macomber. Watson responded that the Court did not have the
"right" to annul a congressional act. 61 CONG. REC. 6474 (1921).
323. Adam Smith listed certainty as one of four prerequisites of any income tax system.
See WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 122, at 778. Certainty was so desirable that some de-
gree of equality (another prerequisite) could be sacrificed to achieve it. Id. This requirement
was well-known and often cited in the 1920s. See Hord, The Sales Tax, 95 ANNALS 193, 198
(1921).
324. Clark, supra note 47, at 736.
325. Seligman, supra note 27, at ix. Clark, supra note 47, at 737, said that "while the
decision in Eisner v. Macomber seems quite simply correct, if it is to be pressed to the extent of
unduly hampering Congress its results will be unfortunate."
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tal gains cases arose.326 The Court knew of the furor and was, in fact, di-
vided on the issue of the Court's role in the tax area. 327 The narrow
construction of the sixteenth amendment created tension and administrative
difficulties. The construction resulted in frequent Court action, friction with
Congress, and appeals to the cumbersome constitutional amendment pro-
cess. The tax system needed flexibility to work effectively, especially in eco-
nomically strained times such as 1921. The capital gains decisions signalled
a retreat from the Court's narrow construction of the sixteenth amendment
and a consequent abandonment of its activist role in the income tax area. In
all of the other areas in which Congress had imposed a tax on the basis of a
power enumerated in the Constitution, the Court had deferred to Congress's
broad power to tax. 328 The sixteenth amendment gave Congress the specific
power to levy income taxes, yet the Court had resisted congressional exercise
of that power. The capital gains cases signalled the Court's acceptance of
this power in the income tax area also.
The Court had several choices in the capital gains cases: the Court could
have held capital gains either taxable or nontaxable, and it could have based
its decision either on statutory or constitutional grounds. A decision up-
holding capital gains taxation on statutory grounds would have necessitated
a constitutional holding also since the taxpayers had raised the issue. On the
other hand, a holding that the statute did not tax capital gains would have
avoided the constitutional issue altogether. As the stock dividend issue had
shown, 329 however, a statutory decision merely delayed temporarily a con-
stitutional decision since Congress would pass another statute explicitly tax-
ing capital gains and thus force the constitutional issue. Given both the
intensity of the power struggle between the Court and Congress in the tax
area and the administrative need for certainty, an immediate resolution of
the inevitable constitutional issue was best. The Court's decision that capital
gains were income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment upheld
what it perceived to be congressional intent.330 The capital gains decisions
thereby maintained the precarious balance of power and provided much
needed certainty.
After the capital gains cases, the Supreme Court decided several other tax
cases in 1921. These decisions supported Congress's constitutional power to
tax in a variety of areas. Both the estate tax and the excess profits tax were
upheld. 331 The scope of Macomber was restricted so as not to apply in two
326. One commentator, for example, suggested that a decision holding the gains taxable
might well lead to a constitutional amendment. Note, supra note 52, at 539.
327. A. MASON & W. BEANEY, supra note 293, at 127-37.
328. For support of broad congressional power to tax, see supra note 257.
329. See discussion of Towne v. Eisner and Eisner v. Macomber, supra notes 304-06 and
accompanying text.
330. That Congress meant to tax capital gains is not entirely clear. See supra notes 191-211
and accompanying text. That the Treasury interpreted the statute as so taxing them, however,
was clear. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. The Court could have assumed that
Congress, knowing of the Treasury's interpretation, approved of it in subsequent enactments of
the tax acts, which did not change that interpretation. See 33 C.J. Internal Revenue § 31
(1924).
331. In New York Trust v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921), the Court held that the estate
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corporate reorganization cases. 332 Thus, by the end of 1921 the Court had
withdrawn from an activist role in the income tax area. In recognizing Con-
gress's comprehensive power to tax, the Court limited its actions to inter-
preting statutes. The halcyon days of substantive constitutional restrictions
on the taxing power were over.
333
tax under the 1916 Act was an indirect tax and, therefore, constitutional. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, relied on Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 46-56 (1900), which had
upheld a legacy tax as an indirect tax.
The Court upheld the definition of invested capital under the Excess Profits Tax in LaBelle
Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 386 (1921). Speaking for the Court, Justice Pitney
stated that in the tax area Congress has great discretion, which the courts have no authority to
question. The fifth amendment due process clause was not a limitation on this power. Id. at
392-93. Arthur Ballantine had predicted the result in LaBelle and its consequent loosening of
constitutional restrictions on congressional taxing power: "[T]he latitude permitted to Con-
gress is likely to be extended under the pressure of new conditions at the further expense of
equality of treatment of individual taxpayers." Ballantine, Some Constitutional Aspects of the
Excess Profits Tax, 29 YALE L.J. 625, 637 (1920). Thus, not only did the Court read the
sixteenth amendment more expansively than previously, but it continued the post-Pollock
trend in the non-income-tax area to remove other constitutional limits to the taxing power.
The capital gains decision was also reaffirmed in Darlington v. Mager, 256 U.S. 682 (1921)
(per curiam), and Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252-53 (1921). Although
the only question in Safe Deposit was how much gain was taxable, the defendant taxpayer re-
argued the capital gains issue. See id. at 249-53.
332. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1921); Rockefeller v. United States,
257 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1921) (both cases decided after capital gains cases).
333. The Court did not immediately and completely defer to congressional tax agendas in
cases in which no enumerated power was involved. The Court's record in that area continued
to be spotty. Some regulatory taxes had been upheld prior to the capital gains cases. E.g.,
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 64 (1904) (tax on butter-colored margarine); United
States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 95 (1919) (tax on narcotics). In 1922, however, the Court
struck down an excise tax on the net income of an employer who used child labor. Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922). In 1936 the Court struck down a processing tax
on commodities passed as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 74-78 (1936). See A. MASON & W. BEANEY, supra note 293, at 140-50.
Professor Tribe sees the Court's inconsistent treatment of tax legislation as an example of
the "internal disarray" of the Lochner model. See L. TRIBE, supra note 276, at 442-43.
Although Tribe asserts that "it would be difficult (perhaps impossible)" to show that the
Court's action in the cases was not "related to the degree of redistribution or interference"
with property rights, he states that a consistent Lochner model would have always used the
degree of interference as a measuring rod. The tax cases, he states, indicate "at least some
ambiguity." Id. at 443.
This Article has shown that the capital gains cases ended that ambiguity in the income tax
area by recognizing that Congress has broad discretion. This concession gutted the Court's
Lochner analysis in the tax area. The income tax, together with the inheritance tax previously
upheld in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 110 (1900), was the most potent tool available to
Congress with which to redistribute wealth. Once the Court recognized Congress's compre-
hensive power to levy income tax, it acknowledged that Congress could interfere significantly
with private property rights. The cases cited above concerning social and economic regulation
via nonenumerated powers involved minor infringements by comparison. The cases striking
down regulatory taxes were the Court's last stand. The battle over congressional ability to
interfere with property rights via taxation had been lost with the capital gains cases of 1921.
The real future battle would not concern the extent of Congress's power to tax, but would
involve the Treasury's power to interpret Congress. In two cases decided close to the time of
the capital gains cases, the Court ruled against the Treasury's interpretation of a statute. See
Smietanka v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 257 U.S. 602, 605 (1922) (1913 Act did not tax income
accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn and unascertained persons); United States v.
Field, 255 U.S. 257, 265 (1921) (property passing under a general power of appointment held
not includable in estate). In both cases, the Court admitted without question that Congress




The capital gains decisions of 1921 are best understood in an historical
context. The cases are more a product of their times than a necessary result
of legal precedent. In particular, contemporary economic and political con-
ditions, as well as the practical effects of some recent Supreme Court cases,
were the decisive factors in the Court's holding that capital gains were in-
come within the sixteenth amendment.
Legal precedent on the capital gains issue could not have been controlling
since prior Supreme Court decisions not only conflicted with each other, but
also conflicted within a single opinion. Only two prior cases had considered
whether realized gains from a casual or infrequent sale of property were
income under an income tax statute. Both cases had held that the gains were
not income. Each case, however, was distinguishable on its facts, even
though the opinions had been neither based on nor limited to such facts.
The corporate excise tax cases had taxed such gains, but technically the tax
at issue in those cases was not an income tax. As recently as 1920 the
Supreme Court had issued contradictory dicta in the income tax case of Eis-
ner v. Macomber as to whether such capital gains were income. Thus, prece-
dent did not dictate any particular conclusion in the capital gains cases.
Even those commentators who favored taxability realized that the prece-
dents were a muddle. No matter which outcome the Court chose, it would
have to repudiate some prior statement.
If legal precedents provided little or no guidance, neither did the econo-
mists or commentators. Economists could not agree on a definition of in-
come. One of the most troubling issues in their search for agreement was the
very issue of whether income included casual capital gains. The legal com-
mentators also divided over the issue, although the majority perhaps favored
taxability.
Politics, on the other hand, provided strong reasons to uphold the taxabil-
ity of capital gains. Since the Pollock decision in 1895 the Court and Con-
gress had been at odds over the extent of congressional power in the taxing
area. Pollock, which created a furor in Congress, had reversed the Court's
broad construction of congressional power. Although the Court retreated
from its viewpoint expressed in Pollock, Congress still found it necessary to
pass the sixteenth amendment. In interpreting the amendment, however, the
Court once again narrowly construed the scope. By acting in this manner,
the Court assumed an activist role in the income tax area. This role created
concerns over the balance of power between the Court and Congress. The
by interpreting the relevant statute so as to include the item. The Court held in both cases that
the Treasury had exceeded its power, First Trust, 257 U.S. at 606; Field, 255 U.S. at 262, and
in both instances Congress included the omitted item in a later statute.
The extent of the Treasury's power is determined to a large degree by whether the Court
defers to the Treasury's interpretation of a statute. This power is still at issue. In Commis-
sioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597, 607-08, 78 L. Ed. 2d 420, 436 (1984), the Court invalidated a
regulation under I.R.C. § 613A (1982) (depletion). Some commentators have viewed this deci-
sion as a "reluctance" on the Court's part to defer to the Treasury. See Holden & Zinn,
Note-Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1983 Term, 38 TAX LAW. 421, 422-24 (1984).
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1920 Macomber decision, in particular, antagonized Congress and raised the
concern over the balance of power to a new pitch. If the Court had over-
ruled Congress again in the capital gains cases, the uproar would have been
tremendous. A decision upholding what the Court perceived to be congres-
sional intent, however, would stabilize the teetering balance.
A pro-tax decision would also preserve the tax base for the Treasury. The
1920 cases of Evans v. Gore and Eisner v. Macomber had diminished the tax
base by holding certain items not taxable under the sixteenth amendment.
In 1921 the government was faced with falling revenues and large, steady
demands for expenditures. The Treasury could not easily withstand a fur-
ther contraction of the tax base. The exclusion of capital gains would have
produced a large gap in revenues. Moreover, as the English experience had
shown, to control this particular exclusion in a fluid post-war economy in
which people exchanged property frequently would have been difficult. 334
In the midst of a depression, the Court surely was sensitive to the govern-
ment's need to tax. As the Court must have known, a decision favoring the
taxability of capital gains would preserve the government's tax base at a time
when revenues were sorely needed.
A decision favoring taxability also made sense from a practical, adminis-
trative sense. As several commentators had noted, the Court's activist ap-
proach, epitomized by Macomber, was unworkable. A tax system, especially
a self-enforced one, needed certainty to work. The Court could not decide
every issue concerning what was or was not income. The Macomber Court's
definitional approach to income, however, continually required such deci-
sions from the Court. A decision upholding congressional intent would indi-
cate the Court's withdrawal from the tax area and provide certainty because
taxable income would be whatever Congress said it was. 335 The Court
would intervene only when a provision was ambiguous.
The capital gains decisions thus provided satisfactory results for a variety
of needs. From a purely judicial standpoint, they resolved an issue that was
unsettled. From an economic standpoint, the decisions preserved a potential
source of revenue for the government. Moreover, the decisions satisfied the
administrative need for certainty in the tax system. Most importantly, how-
ever, in a political and constitutional sense they restored an historic balance
of power in the tax field between the judicial and legislative branches of gov-
ernment. With these decisions the Court basically ceased its activist role in
substantive tax matters.
The Court's recognition of Congress's broad power to tax gave the tax
334. See Clark, supra note 47, at 739 (citing a Manchester Guardian article of April 2,
1920, in which the Royal Commission urged the taxing of speculative gains).
335. In 1931 the Court explicitly recognized the abdication of its activist role, which had
been maintained in large part by judicial definitions of "income." In United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931), the Court held that the discharge of indebtedness was
income. In so doing the Court accepted the Treasury Regulations as a "correct statement of
the law." Id. The Court's own interpretation was not necessary since "[w]e see nothing to be




system the flexibility it needed; the existence of a broad power to tax, how-
ever, did not mean that the power had to be exercised. Congress retained
legislative discretion to fashion complex revenue-producing statutes to meet
changing needs and conditions. If, for example, the taxation of capital gains
created economic problems, then Congress was free to change the law. The
capital gains cases ensured that the changes would withstand constitutional
challenges. The decision was in congressional hands. 336
336. Some commentators thought that the taxation of capital gains hindered the economy
by preventing sales. The New York Times thought that business could not survive under the
restraint of such taxation. Editorial, Trading and Taxing, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1921, at 10.
However, as one commentator said: "If the law as it stands works unjustly, it is up to Con-
gress to change it." Comment, supra note 81, at 858. That is exactly what Congress did. The
Revenue Act of 1921 was the first to provide for the preferential treatment of capital gains (a
maximum rate of 121/2%) and to expand greatly the nonrecognition provisions.
Congress, of course, did not stop with its 1921 provisions. Congress has changed the capital
gains provisions again and again and again-but that is another story.
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